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INTRODUCTION

Water users in the eastern states, including Missouri, traditionally have
thought of water as a free good, to be taken and used at will. The only constraints have been physical availability and the common law doctrines that
limit each water user to his fair share. In practice, there usually has been
enough water to satisfy the demands of all water users. The common law
doctrines evolved in an environment of water surplus and were designed
to deal with local water use conflicts between individual users. Because that
water surplus environment has lasted almost to the present time, a majority
of the thirty-one eastern states has retained the common law doctrines as
the sole basis for allocating water between various users.
Concern over the continued availability of water has grown in recent
years. The drought of the middle 1960s seriously depleted groundwater and
reservoir supplies on the eastern seaboard,I causing serious disagreement
2
between New York City and Philadelphia over water in the Delaware River.
Such regional water shortages have been threats ever since and have
3
materialized from time to time.

1. See, e.g., J. WRIGHT, THE COMING WATER FAMINE 21-28 (1966);
Thomas, Reality ofDrought isAlways with Us, 74 NAT. HIST., Nov. 1965, at 50, 55-56;
Downhill Winds, TIME,July 16, 1965, at 21; DroughtSpreads: EastDying Up, Midwest
Threatened, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 8, 1966, at 66-67.
2. See, e.g., J. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 27; Coleman, Dly Comments on Water,
23 N.Y. COUNTY B. BULL. 9, 11-12 (1965); The People-Water Crisis, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 23, 1965, at 48. Diversions to New York City again were reduced in early
1981 as a result of the persistence of the 1980 drought. See Adler & Agrest, Drought
in the Northeast, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 5, 1981, at 20.
3. Severe drought conditions existed in the far west throughout the 1977
growing season because of insubstantial snowfalls during the previous winter and
little rainfall during the summer. The winter wheat region of the midwest
experienced drought conditions in the spring, but it dissipated during the summer.
See generally NORTH AMERICAN DROUGHTS 1-2, 40, 143-44 (N. Rosenberg ed.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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The drought of 1977 brought the water shortage problem to Missouri,
when corn irrigators and cities dependent on groundwater feared a total loss
of water supplies. 4 Autumn rains broke'that drought, but the heat wave and
drought of 1980-1981 recreated the problem in Missouri. 5 The 1977 drought
caused the legislature to consider water diversion legislation, 6 but it died in
committee when the rains returned. While little political support may exist
for a water diversion permit system in Missouri, recent increases in water
use in Missouri, particularly by irrigators, make the static water supply continually more unreliable and require reconsideration of future reliance on
the common law doctrines. This Article examines the need in Missouri for
a water diversion permit statute and suggests the form such a statute should
take.
II.

COMPETITION FOR WATER IN MISSOURI

The major water users in Missouri fall into two categories: nonconsumptive and consumptive. Navigation flow and hydroelectric power are the two
major nonconsumptive water uses. 7 Public water supply and irrigation are
the major consumptive water uses in Missouri, followed by industrial and
mining uses." In addition, minimum flows must be maintained in streams
for the maintenance of fish and wildlife habitat.
The Missouri River is a major source of water in Missouri. Upstream
depletions are expected to increase thirty-seven percent by the year 2020, 9
resulting from increased diversions for irrigation, particularly in the Garrison Project in North Dakota, mining in Montana, and coal slurry pipelines.
1978); Spreading Impact of Worst Drought in Decades, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP., Mar.
7, 1977, at 55-56; Swollen Silos, Edgy Farmers,TIME, Sept. 12, 1977, at 18;Just Tying to Survive, TIME,July 11, 1977, at 30; Isthe U.S. RunningOut of Water?,U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP.,July 18, 1977, at 35. The previous major droughts in the midwest
were those of 1956 and 1934. NORTH AMERICAN DROUGHTS, supra, at 32, 34-36,

38-39.
4. The northwestern quadrant of Missouri was experiencing drought at the
beginning of the growing season in 1977. While the drought dissipated during the
summer, drought conditions developed in northeastern Missouri that summer. MidMissouri was subjected to drought throughout the growing season. NORTH
AMERICAN DROUGHTS, supranote 3, at 40, 144. The previous major droughts in
Missouri were those of 1956 and 1934. Id. at 32, 34-36, 38-39.
5. See generally The Mississippi: A Nation's BlockedArtey, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Mar. 2, 1981, at 57; If There'sNo Relieffrom Drought, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 9, 1981, at 49-50; TheMisery Spreads, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP., Aug.
4, 1980, at 14.
6. See note 203 and accompanying text infra.
7. P. DAVIS, J. SHARP, JR. &J. FALTEISEK, MISSOURI INSTREAM FLOW
REQUIREMENTS: A PHYSICAL AND LEGAL ASSESSMENT 17-57 (Mo. Office of
Admin. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MISSOURI INSTREAM FLOW REQUIREMENTS].
An extensive body of information on the sizes and locations of water resources, uses,
and potential shortages is contained in this report.
8. Id. at 33.
9. Id. at 57.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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In September 1981, South Dakota agreed to divert 50,000 acre-feet per year
from the Oahe Reservoir for use in a coal slurry pipeline from Wyoming
to Arkansas.
Missouri contains several areas with existing or potential water shortages. First, the Missouri River has a substantial allocation to navigation
flows. Diversions for irrigation, mining, and coal slurry pipelines in upstream
states will substantially reduce the flow presently available to Missouri. Second, the basin north of the Missouri River and the basin between Kansas
City andJoplin within 100 miles of the Kansas border contain streams with
very low base flows and have limited or saline groundwater supplies.
Although there is little capacity for substantial diversions in those basins,
supplemental irrigation is a rapidly growing water use there. Third, the
basins surrounding St. Louis are rapidly becoming more urban, with increased diversions and competition between users. Fourth, a few basins in
the Ozarks have rivers within the National Scenic Riverway System or National Wildlife Refuges, where river flows are fully dedicated to scenic or
wildlife uses. 10
The competition between water users that is critical or soon will become
critical in Missouri is between diverters, instream users such as hydroelectric
power, and minimum flow requirements for recreational use and fish and
wildlife habitat. The common law allocation doctrines cannot deal effectively
with this competition.
III.

INADEQUACIES OF COMMON LAW ALLOCATION DOCTRINES

Missouri, like most eastern states, follows common law doctrines for
allocating water in surface watercourses and groundwater. These doctrines
presume a surplus of water and are designed to resolve the occasional disputes
between individual water users. Because they do not establish comprehensive regulation, these doctrines are not suitable in periods of chronic water
shortages. This section discusses the allocation doctrines for surface watercourses and groundwater followed in the eastern states and in Missouri.
A.

Suoace Watercourses: RiparianRights

Water in surface watercourses is allocated between users by the common law doctrine of riparian rights. Formulated in its modem form in 1827
in Tyler v. Wilkinson,I the doctrine essentially grants each person whose land
abuts on a watercourse a right to use a fair share of the water supply. Each
riparian has two contradictory rights. First, he is entitled to natural flow,
i.e., to have the water flow down to him in its natural quantity and quality.
Second, he and all other riparians on the watercourse have equal rights to
make reasonable uses of that water. 12 Reasonableness is determined by com-

10. MISSOURI INSTREAM FLOW REQUIREMENTS, supra note 7, at 10, 13-15,
17-22, 71-92.
11. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
12. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312); Har-

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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paring the claimant riparian's use with those uses of the other affected
riparians. 13 The reasonableness determination is affected by the character
of the stream from which the water is diverted, the nature and location of
the claimant's use, the degree to which downstream riparians' uses are interfered with by the claimant's use, the degree to which upstream riparians'
uses are precluded in order to make water available to the claimant, and
the nature and locations of the upstream and downstream riparians' uses., 4
The riparian doctrine is internally inconsistent. It is frequently
impossible both to maintain the natural flow and to allow riparians to make
reasonable uses, because the latter either alters flow patterns or consumes
water. Because of this inconsistency, courts have been forced to emphasize
15
either the natural flow or the reasonable use theory of the riparian doctrine.
The natural flow theory provides that every riparian is entitled to the
natural flow of the watercourse in both quantity and quality, subject only
to the domestic uses of upper riparians. His riparian right is violated by any
use or diversion that diminishes this flow past his land; whether he actually
is injured by the diminution is irrelevant.
The reasonable use theory allows each riparian to use and divert the
water in reasonable quantities, taking into consideration the size and nature
of the body of water and the needs of other riparians. It is a comparative
reasonableness concept. The courts maintain that if the lower riparian does
not suffer any actual damage, he cannot have the diversion enjoined. 1 6 No
riparian, however, is entitled to take all of the water in a stream to the in7
jury of another riparian.1
Over the last 100 years, most American courts have emphasized the
reasonable use theory of the riparian rights doctrine.18 Missouri, like the
ris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d
161 (Mo. 1964); Ripka v. Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979).
13. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Ripka v. Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979); Townsend v. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462,
60 N.E. 757 (1901); Lauer, Reflections onRiparianism,35 MO. L. REv. 1,9-10(1970).
14. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Evans
v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492 (1842).
15. See generally Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 210-213 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Gehlen Bros. v. Knorr, 101 Iowa 700, 70 N.W.757 (1897); Stratton v. Mount Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913).
17. See, e.g., Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d
825 (1967).
18. See, e.g., Parke v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468
(1907); Merriwether v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216 (1872). But see McCord
v. Big Bros. Movement, 120 N.J. Eq. 446, 185 A. 490 (1936). A count of riparian
rights cases dealing with water pollution confirms the conclusion that the reasonable
use theory predominates. Davis, Theories of Water PollutionLitigation, 1971 WIS. L.
REV. 738, Appendix A. For a functional analysis of the reasonable use theory, see
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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majority of eastern states following the riparian doctrine, emphasizes the
reasonable use theory.19
In practice as well as in theory, the riparian doctrine generally allows
entry of new users and requires old users to accommodate them. 20 Also, the
C. Davis, Introduction to Water Law of the Eastern States, in 7 WATER AND WATER
RIGHTS 1, 36-52 (R. Clark ed. 1976).
19. The Missouri Supreme Court appeared to take that position in Bollinger
v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Mo. 1964), where the court stated:
The rights of a riparian owner in the water of a stream, in jurisdictions
wherein the doctrine of riparian rights obtain, include "the right to the
flow of the stream in its natural course and in its natural condition in respect
of both volume and purity, except as affected by reasonable use by other
proprietors ......
That indication was reinforced by the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Higday v.
Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App., K.C. 1971), when it held that henceforth
the law of groundwater allocation will parallel the rule of comparative reasonableness
already employed for allocation of water in surface watercourses. The Southern
District Court of Appeals confirmed that Missouri had adopted the reasonable use
emphasis of riparian rights in a 1979 decision. Acknowledging that the prior decisions appeared to have already adopted that interpretation, the court in Ripka v.
Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Mo. App., S.D.1979), held:
The "reasonable use" theory allows each riparian proprietor to make a
reasonable use of the water for any purpose, providing that the use does
not cause harm or damage to the reasonable uses of others .... If Missouri
has not adopted the reasonable use theory, we believe it should. It appears
to be more flexible and promotes the most beneficial use of water resources.
The court then proceeded to adopt the guidelines set forth in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1977), for analyzing the reasonableness of riparian
uses:
(a) The purpose of the use,
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake,
(c) the economic value of the use,
(d) the social value of the use,
(e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes,
()
the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or method
of use of one proprietor or the other,
(g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by each
proprietor,
(h) the protection of existing values of water uses, land, investments and
enterprises, and
(i)
the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the loss.
589 S.W.2d at 335.
For detailed discussions of the riparian doctrine in Missouri, see T. LAUER,
P. DAVIS &J. CUNNINGHAM, MISSOURI STATE LAWS PERTAINING TO WATER
AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES 11-30 (Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 2d ed. 1977);
Reprise- The Rights of a Riparian Landowner in Missouri, 49 UMKC L. REV. 115
(1980).
20. About one-half of 50 decisions in five midwestern states uphold the entry
of new users. See, e.g., Gehlen Bros. v. Knorr, 101 Iowa 700, 70 N.W. 757 (1897)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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instream flow needs of recreational riparian users often are protected.21 The
courts have yet to consider whether the riparian rights doctrine protects the
water flow and level requirements of privately owned fish and wildlife habitat.
A riparian must use the diverted water on riparian land 22 within the
(established mill not entitled to historic flow); Bass v. City of Fort Wayne, 121 Ind.
389, 23 N.E. 259 (1890) (established mill not entitled to enjoin new municipal diversion); Hoover v. Crane, 362 Mich. 36, 106 N.W.2d 563 (1960) (irrigation diversion from lake permitted although it lowered level of lake used by established resort);
Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964) (irrigation use allowed to take some
water claimed by established mill); City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63
N.E. 600 (1902) (new municipal diversion could reduce flow to established mill).
But see C. DAVIS, RIPARIAN WATER LAW: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 48-49 (Nat'l
Water Comm'n Legal Study No. 2, 1971) (suggests that prior users often are protected from encroachments by later users).
21. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967); Taylor v.
Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950); Hoover v. Crane, 362 Mich. 36, 106
N.W.2d 563 (1960); Dardenne Realty Co. v. Abeken, 232 Mo. App. 945, 106
S.W.2d 966 (St. L. 1937).
22. The two basic definitions of riparian land are the "source of title" test
and the "unity of title" test. The source of title test, which has been expounded
by western prior appropriation states to deal with residual riparian rights, provides
that riparian land consists only of abutting lands that have always been held as a
single tract throughout its chain of title. See, e.g., Boehmer v. Big Rock Creek Irrigation Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 48 P. 908 (1897); Yearsley v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285,
270 P. 804 (1928). The unity of title test, which has been followed by some western
states during their period of adherence to the riparian doctrine, provides that all
tracts contiguous to the abutting tract are riparian if held under common ownership, regardless of when they were acquired. See, e.g., Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180
Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966); Jones v. Conn, 39 Or. 30, 64 P. 855 (1901).
The only eastern riparian state that has considered the question has opted for the
unity of title test. See Consolidated Water Supply Co. v. State Hospital for Criminal
Insane, 66 Pa. Super. 610 (1917), aff'd, 267 Pa. 29, 110 A. 281 (1920); Slack v.
Marsh, 11 Phila. 543 (Pa. C.P. 1875). See generally Farnham, The PermissibleExtent
of RiparianLand, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 31 (1972); Davis, AustralianandAmerican
Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 647, 680-81
(1968); C. Davis, supra note 18, at 71-77.
The amount of riparian land under the unity of title test is about 401% greater
than under the source of title test in typical rural circumstances. H. ELLIS, J.
BEUSCHER, C. HOWARD &J. DEBRAAL, WATER-USE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN WISCONSIN 262 (1970) (discussing and reproducing maps from F.
Osterhaudt, Economic Analysis of Wisconsin's Diversion Permit System for
Agricultural Irrigation (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Wis. 1968)); D. Levi,
An Evaluation of Legal Theories Currently Employed to Determine Which Lands
are Riparian 17 (Mo. Water Resources Center, Univ. of Mo.-Columbia, Proj. No.
A-027-Mo., June 1, 1971).
The limits of riparian land under either test frequently bear little relation to the
limits of economically irrigable land. Levi & Schneeberger, The Chainand Unity of
Title Theoriesfor DelineatingRiparianLand: Economic Analysis as an Alternative to Case
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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watershed. 23 Under the presumed majority rule, the riparian right to divert
water is limited to riparians; 24 nonriparians have no right to divert. 25 A few
cases, however, permit a riparian to grant a nonriparian the right to divert
and to enforce that grant against affected nonconsenting riparians. 2 6 This
is presumed to be the minority rule, although as many, if not more, eastern
27
decisions adhere to this minority rule as follow the "majority" rule.
Two rules can alter the ordinary allocation under the comparative
reasonableness theory of the riparian doctrine. First, natural uses-domestic,
household, and livestock water used to sustain life- are absolutely preferred over artificial uses-irrigation, industrial, and power uses that merely
make life more convenient. The water demands of natural uses are to be
met fully before any diversions for artificial uses can be made. 2 Second,
prescriptive rights to use water in violation of the riparian rights of others
29
can be acquired by long, adverse use.
The riparian doctrine just described has several characteristics that make
it unsuitable for private water users when a chronic water shortage or an
absence of a sizeable surplus exists. First, the doctrine is not comprehenPrecedent, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 439, 443-47 (1972); D. Levi, supra; F. Osterhaudt,
supra, discussed in H. ELLISJ. BEUSCHER, C. HOWARD &J.DEBRAAL, supra, at 262.
23. See Harrell v. City of Conway, 224 Ark. 100, 271 S.W.2d 924 (1954);
Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907); Davis, supra
note 22, at 681; Farnham, supra note 22.
24. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312); Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d
161 (Mo. 1964).
25. Heilbron v. Fowler Switch Canal Co., 75 Cal. 426, 17 P. 535 (1888). See
also Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter, 159 Eng. Rep. 545 (Ex. 1864).
26. Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18 (1891); Lawrie v. Silsby, 82 Vt.
505, 74 A. 94 (1909). Contra Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1909);
Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535 (1913).
27. See Davis, supra note 18, at 756 nn.77-81.
28. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955) (dictum);
Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 150 P.2d 405 (1944); Evans v. Merriweather,
4 111. (3 Scam.) 492 (1842) (dictum); Spence v. McDonough, 77 Iowa 460, 42 N.W.
371 (1889); City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902); Filbert
v. Dechert, 22 Pa. Super. 362 (1903); Ausness, Water Use Permits in a RiparianState:
Problemsand Proposals, 66 KY. L.J. 191, 198-99 (1977); Beuscher,Appropriation Water
Law Elements in RiparianDoctrine States, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 448, 452 (1961); C.
Davis, supra note 18, at 77-82.
29. Some states require a bare invasion of legal right to constitute adversity.
See, e.g., Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 124, 211 P. 11 (1922); Harvey Realty Co.
v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 A. 60 (1930); Exton v. Glen Gardner Water Supply Co., 3 N.J. Eq. 613, 129 A. 255 (1925). Other states require
a material injury. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mount Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass.
83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913); Kennedy v. Niles Water Co., 173 Mich. 474, 139 N.W.
241 (1913); Ausness, supranote 28, at 205-07; Davis, supranote 22, at 683-84; Hamsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 WIs. L. REV. 47, 48-49.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2

8

1982]

Davis: Davis: Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes:
WATER PERMIT STATUTES FOR MISSOURI

437

sive; it is designed to deal with the occasional dispute, which is resolved by
litigation. Thus, allocations are made on a case-by-case basis. Such a decisionmaking process tends to result in inconsistent decisions. The rights of
individual water users are affected by the vagaries of venue, judicial personnel, and jury selection. The role of appellate courts in enforcing uniformity cannot offset those vagaries completely. Second, the rights of most water
users are quantitatively undefined. The riparian doctrine in essence only
sets forth guidelines for establishing allocations. The allocations can be
established only by litigation. Since most water users are not parties to litigation, they have no defined allocations; the extent of their rights is uncertain
and unpredictable. Third, no allocation under riparian rights law is permanent. Any allocation may be altered by the entry of new users, changes
in use patterns by either the litigants or other riparians, or changes in the
characteristics of the watercourse. 30 This is true, even of allocations established by litigation. Fourth, litigation typically does not involve all interrelated
water users. Hence, a court decree cannot protect the litigants from uses
by nonparties.

3 1

To avoid those problems of uncertainty and obsolescence, large water
users in the east sometimes resort to various legal strategies to make their
rights more certain. They may purchase the rights of competing or potential new water users.3 2 Public water utilities and electric generating utilities
may acquire water rights by condemning the rights of potential water use
competitors. 33 Occasionally, water users can secure legislation that protects

30. See generally VIA AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.58, at 170 (A. Casner
ed. 1954); Lauer, supra note 13, at 13-14; Ziegler, Water Use under Common Law Doctrines, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 51, 71 (Univ. of Mich. Law School
1958).
31. The court expressly recognized this problem in Patten Paper Co. v.
Kaukauna Water-Power Co., 70 Wis. 659, 35 N.W. 737 (1887).
32. See generally Davis, supra note 22, at 678-79.
33. The following entities have the power to condemn water rights in Missouri:
a.
water companies-MO. REV. STAT. § 393.030 (1978)
b.
joint municipal utility commissions-d. § 393.715
c.
river conservancy districts-Id. §§ 257.220-.230
d.
rural electric cooperatives--Id. § 394.080
e.
soil and water conservation subdistricts-Id. § 278.245
f.
hydro-electric dams-Id. §§ 236.010, .180, .280
water supply districts-Id. §§ 247.210, .440
g.
h.
levee districts-Id. § 245.095
i.
drainage districts-Id. §§ 242.190; 243.120-.130
j.
cities-Id. §§ 79.380; 81.170; 82.240, .790, .800; 88.497, .667
k.
waterworks-Id. §§ 91.570- .573
1.
towns and villages-Id. § 80.090
m. counties-Id. § 49.300
See generally Davis, supra note 22, at 678.
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their rights.3 4 They may contract with competing water users to allocate the
water. 35 They may use water contrary to their riparian rights to acquire rights
36
against all existing competitors by prescription.
The riparian doctrine also is unsuited to protect many public interests
that exist in watercourses. The doctrine apparently has never been used by
members of the public or by governmental entities to assert public rights
in water. 3 7 Because the doctrine is not formulated to address public rights,
the absence of cases is not surprising. But, if the government is a landowner,
it can assert the same rights of flow maintenance as a private riparian. Hence,
the lake level and stream flow maintenance cases. related to private recreational use would protect flows past government-owned lands. 38 There are,
however, no private riparian rights cases involving maintenance of flow for
39
fish and wildlife habitat.
The state navigation servitude is available to enable the state to prevent
encroachment on flows necessary to maintain the navigable capacity of
navigable streams. Such flows are not subject to diversion under the riparian
doctrine. Although this doctrine might be extended to encompass preservation of flows on floatable streams for recreational boating purposes, the
servitude would not be applicable for maintaining flows to fish and wildlife
habitat because they do not involve navigation or boating.
Some have argued that riparian rights include having the view of a watercourse or lake protected from degradation by diversion of flows. 40 Even if
such a right exists, it would not extend to the state as a nonriparian protector of the public interest in those same views.
34. For example, in Wisconsin, existing water users may veto the granting
of a diversion permit to a riparian for agricultural irrigation, even though at common law such a diversion could be made as of right (in the absence of substantial
injury). WIs. STAT. ANN. §30.18(5) (West 1973). The principal beneficiaries ofthat
statute are hydro-electric dams. See Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 8 Wis. 2d 582, 99 N.W.2d 821 (1959).
35. Examples were litigated in Kimberly-Clark Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 153
Wis. 69, 140 N.W. 1066 (1913), and Patten Paper Co. v. Kaukauna Water-Power
Co., 70 Wis. 659, 35 N.W. 737 (1887). See generally Davis, supranote 22, at 678-79;
Note, Are Water Rights Marketable in Wisconsin?, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 942.
36. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
37. MISSOURI INSTREAM FLOW REQUIREMENTS, supra note 7, at 136.
38. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
39. MISSOURI INSTREAM FLOW REQUIREMENTS, supra note 7, at 136.
40. A few cases granted damages for loss of view as part of a condemnation
award. See Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (1935); Thiesen
v. Gulf, F. &A. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918); Keintz v. State, 2 A.D.2d 415,
156 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1956). Other cases have rejected such elements of condemnation awards. See Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969); International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 30 S.E.2d 537 (1944); F.
MALONEY, S. PLAGER &F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE
FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 113-16 (1968).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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The inability to use the riparian doctrine to protect public interests in
recreational waters and fish and wildlife habitat, its locational restrictions,
its inadequacies related to uncertainty, insecurity of right, and allocation
obsolescence, and its absence of comprehensive allocation make the doctrine
inappropriate for allocation of water supplies in a future of water shortages.
Although groundwater is plentiful in many locations, the allocation doctrines
applying to underground water are equally inappropriate.

B.

Underground Water

Traditionally, groundwater has been divided into two classes, each with
its own independent allocation rules. Underground streams 41 are subject
to the riparian doctrine and allocations are made on the basis of comparative
reasonableness. 42 Besides being subject to all of the inadequacies of the
riparian doctrine as it applies to surface watercourses, the underground
stream rules apply only to such streams if they were known to exist prior
43
to the interference with their flow.
Percolating groundwater, underground water not in known
underground streams,4 4 is allocated under one of three rules. Some states
41. An underground stream is a body of underground water flowing in a fixed
and defined channel whose existence and location is known or ascertainable from
surface indications or other means not requiring excavation. Killian v. Killian, 175
Ala. 224, 57 So. 825 (1912); Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So.
780 (1896); Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1906); Barclay v. Abraham,
121 Iowa 619, 96 N.W. 1080 (1903); Nourse v. Andrews, 200 Ky. 467, 255 S.W.
84 (1923); Western Md. R.R. v. Martin, 110 Md. 554, 73 A. 267 (1909); Clarke
County v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 80 Miss. 535, 31 So. 905 (1902); Springfield
Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (St. L. 1895); Jones v. Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638 (1960); Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio
St. 294 (1861); Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012 (1890);
Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927).
Hydrologists argue that there is no such thing as an underground stream with
a defined channel and definite direction, except in rare instances, such as in
Missouri's cavernous limestone region in the Ozarks. See C. CORKER, GROUND
WATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 147 (Nat'l Water Comm'n
Legal Study No. 6, 1971); Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and WaterLaw: What is Their
Future Common Ground?, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 7, 10-11 (Univ. of
Mich. Law School 1958); Tolman & Stipp, Analysis of Legal Concepts of Subflow and
PercolatingWaters, 21 OR. L. REV. 113, 121-24, 130-32 (1942).
42. See cases cited note 41, 1, supra.
43. Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638 (1960);
Ewart v. Belfast Poor-Law Guardians, 9 L.R. Ir. 172 (Ch. 1881); Bleachers' Ass'n
Ltd. v. Chapel-en-le-Frith Rural Dist. Council, [1933] Ch. 356; cases cited note
41, 1, supra.
44. Percolating groundwater is all underground water that seeps, oozes, filters,
and otherwise circulates through subsurface strata without a defined channel. Killian
v. Killian, 175 Ala. 224, 57 So. 825 (1912);Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228
Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957); Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

11

440

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

follow the "absolute ownership" rule, which gives each landowner an absolute right to withdraw percolating groundwater for use at any location or
to affect it in the use of his land without liability to his neighbor for injurious
consequences. 45 The only apparent limitation is that he must not engage
in those activities in a wasteful manner or maliciously for the sole purpose
4 6
of injuring his neighbor.
Many states follow the "reasonable use" rule, which does not provide
what its name suggests. It does not employ a comparative reasonableness
test, as do the rules with the same label for surface watercourses and for diffused surface water.4 7 Instead, it provides that each landowner may use percolating groundwater as under the absolute ownership rule, but that the use
of groundwater or the use of land affecting it must occur on his own over48
lying land.
20 So. 780 (1896); Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1909); Burroughs
v. Saterlee, 67 Iowa 396, 25 N.W. 808 (1885); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers,
259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953); Western Md. R.R. v. Martin, 110 Md. 554, 73 A.
267 (1909); Upjohn v. Board of Health, 46 Mich. 542, 9 N.W. 845 (1881); Erickson
v. Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 105 Minn. 182, 117 N.W. 435
(1908); Clarke County v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 80 Miss. 535, 31 So. 905 (1902);
Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (St. L. 1895); Bloodgood
v. Ayers, 108 N.Y. 400, 15 N.E. 433 (1888);Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638 (1960); Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861);
Rothrauffv. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940); Clinchfield
Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927); Pence v. Carney, 58
W. Va. 296, 52 S.E. 702 (1905); Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354
(1903). Underground water is presumed to be percolating groundwater unless
evidence establishes the existence of an underground stream. See cases cited supra.
45. Swift&Co. v. PeoplesCoal&OilCo., 121 Conn. 579, 186A. 629 (1936);
New York ContinentalJewell Filtration Co. v. Jones, 37 App. D.C. 511 (1911);
Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1909); City of Greencastle v. Hazelett,
23 Ind. 186 (1864); Greenleafv. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1836); Rose v.
Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934); White River Chair Co.
v. Connecticut River Power Co., 105 Vt. 24, 162 A. 859 (1932).
46. Swift&Co. v. Peoples Coal &Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 186A. 629(1936);
Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1909); Gagnon v. French Lick Springs
Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687, 72 N.E. 849 (1904); Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164(1882);
Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1836); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum
Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934). Contra,Chatfield v. Wilson, 18 Vt. 49 (1856).
47. See State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 299-301, 217
N.W.2d 339, 349-50 (1974); Davis, Mineral Rights: Conveyances and Leases in
Missouri-PartII, 33J. Mo. B. 248, 250 (1977); Davis, Wells andStreams:Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REV. 189, 202-03 (1972); WaterLaw-GroundwaterRightsin
Missouri-A Needfor Clarification, 37 MO. L. REV. 357, 359 (1972).
48. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764
(1936); DeBok v. Doak, 188 Iowa 597, 176 N.W. 631 (1920); Associated Contractors Stone Co. v. Pewee Valley Sanitarium & Hosp., 376 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1963);
Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164 (1882); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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A few states, including Missouri, follow what might be called the
"eastern correlative rights" rule. 49 It provides that each landowner may use
percolating groundwater on his own land or on other nonoverlying land,
or make any use of his own land that affects percolating groundwater,
50
provided his neighbor is not unreasonably injured. It is essentially the same
allocation concept employed for surface watercourses under the reasonable
use theory of the riparian doctrine, subject only to the greater physical dif51
ficulty of predicting the consequences of a diversion of underground water.
None of the three rules relating to percolating groundwater are adequate.
The absolute ownership and reasonable use rules allow a landowner to take
whatever groundwater he needs without regard to the needs of or effects on
his neighbors. At best, he may divert without bothering to determine whether
his neighbor would be adversely affected. At worst, short of malice, he can
with foreknowledge drain away his neighbor's underground water supply.
The rules conclusively presume that the groundwater diverter does not and
cannot know the injurious effect of his diversion even when, in fact, he does
or could readily determine the effect. 52 The eastern correlative rights rule
248 A.2d 106 (1968); Davison v. City of Ann Arbor, 237 Mich. 453, 212 N.W.
81 (1927); Clarke County v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 80 Miss. 535, 31 So. 905
(1902); Meekerv. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 74A. 379 (1909); Dunbar
v. Sweeney, 230 N.Y. 609, 130 N.E. 913 (1921) (mem.); Rousev. City of Kinston,
188 N.C. 1, 123 S.E. 482 (1924); Logan Gas Co. v. Glasgo, 122 Ohio St. 126, 170
N.E. 874 (1930); Rothrauffv. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d
87 (1940); Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co., 104W. Va. 368, 140 S.E. 57 (1927).
49. The author has identified this rule as the "eastern correlative rights rule."
See T. LAUER, P. DAvis &J. CUNNINGHAM, supranote 19, at 33; Davis, Mineral
Rights: Convgyanes andLeasesin Missouri- PartII, supranote 47, at 250; Davis, Groundwater Pollution: Case Law Theoriesfor Relief, 39 MO. L. REv. 117, 123-24 (1974);
Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship atLaw, supra note 47, at 203-04. Most courts
refer to this rule as the "reasonable use" rule, even though it is dramatically different in concept from the second rule, also called the "reasonable use" rule. The
author has suggested the new identification for the third rule to distinguish it from
the second rule. The "eastern correlative rights" rule should not be confused with
the "correlative rights" rule of some western states that requires prorationing of
groundwater during shortages. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766
(1903); Davis, Wells andStreams: Relationshipat Law, supranote 47, at 203; 37 Mo.
L. REV., supra note 47, at 361.
50. Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957);
MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d 417
(1963); Cason v. Florida Power Co., 74 Fla. 1, 76 So. 535 (1917); Erickson v.
Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 100 Minn. 481, 111 N.W. 391 (1907);
Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App., K.C. 1971); Bassett v. Salisbury
Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn.
App. 446, 89 S.W.2d 889 (1936); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis.
2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974).
51. See Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, supra note 47, at 234-38.
522, 58N.E.
164N.Y.Repository,
CityofNewYork,
SeeForbellv.
52.by University
Published
of Missouri
School of Law Scholarship
1982 644(1900); Frazier
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prohibits the knowing injurious diversion if it is unreasonable in amount
under the circumstances, but it does not adequately protect the neighbor
from an unknowing injurious diversion. Furthermore, the eastern correlative
rights doctrine is subject to all of the inadequacies of the riparian doctrine
stemming from its uncertainty, insecurity, and allocation obsolescence.
None of the common law groundwater allocation doctrines deals with
the problem of groundwater mining, which occurs when withdrawals exceed the average annual recharge of the aquifer. The result is a gradual dropping of the water table and eventual extinction of the aquifer by salt water
intrusion or exhaustion .53 Nothing in the groundwater allocation rules prohibits groundwater mining; the rules only allocate the groundwater available
at any given time.
C.

InterrelationshipBetween Surface Watercourses and Groundwater

Surface watercourses and groundwater are intimately related in many
areas of the country, including Missouri. The base flow in most watercourses
is derived from groundwater. These are effluent streams because groundwater is discharged into them. Some streams act as a source for groundwater.
In those streams, called influent streams, the water in the stream percolates
into the groundwater supply. 54

Although this hydrologic relationship has been well understood for
several decades,55 the common law has taken little notice of it. Eastern cases
involving interactions between surface watercourses and groundwater
sometimes do recognize the hydrologic relationship, but the courts have not
developed any doctrinal basis for dealing with interrelationship cases. Cases
have been decided on the basis of surface watercourse allocation rules, both
natural flow and reasonable use, and the various groundwater allocation
v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861); Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354
(1903); Chasemore v. Richards, 2 H. & N. 168, 157 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ex. 1857), aff'd,
7 H.L. Gas. 349, 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (1859). Contra, Dickinson v. GrandJunction
Canal Co., 7 Ex. 282, 155 Eng. Rep. 953 (1852).
53. On the hydrology and law of groundwater over-development, or "mining," see C. McGUINNESS, WATER LAW WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
GROUNDWATER 11 (U.S. Geological Survey Circ. No. 114, 1951); NATIONAL
WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 238-39 (Final Report,
June 1973); Bagley, WaterRights Law and PublicPoliciesRelating to Ground Water "'Mining" in the Southwestern States, 4J.L. & ECON. 144, 166-67 (1961); Crosby, A Layman's
Guide to GroundwaterHydrology, in C. CORKER, supra note 41, at 75-76. For western
cases and statutes on groundwater mining, see, e.g., Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77
N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966); Baker v.Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513
P.2d 627 (1973); IDAHO CODE §42-237a(g) (1977); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
46-6-6.2 (1967).
54. See Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, supra note 47, at 196-97
& nn.23-24.
55. Id. at 229 n.127.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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rules, with no clear reasons given for the choice of rule.56 Only when a state

has adopted both the reasonable use theory of riparian rights for surface
watercourses and for underground streams and the eastern correlative rights
rule for percolating groundwater will it have a consistent set of rules. Comparative reasonableness will apply to all cases.
EXISTING WATER USE REGULATION IN MISSOURI

IV.

Regulation of uses of and diversions from surface watercourses and
groundwater by state agencies is nonexistent in Missouri. Diversions from
surface watercourses and groundwater, if sufficiently large, must be reported,
and certain dams can be built only under a court permit. This section will
discuss briefly those statutory provisions.
A.

Reporting of Large Diversions

To aid the Department of Natural Resources in collecting water resource
data, the legislature enacted a large diversion reporting requirement in 1969.
All persons, firms, corporations, and political subdivisions withdrawing an
average of more than 25,000 gallons per day during any thirty-day period
from groundwater or surface water sources must report those withdrawals
annually by January 15 of the following year.57 According to an official of
the Missouri Geological Survey, a substantial number of diverters do not
submit the required reports. 58 The reason for the noncompliance is presumed
to be the absence of any enforcement or penalty provisions in the statute. 9
B.

Regulation of CertainDams on Smaller Watercourses

Chapter 236 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides that milldams
and hydroelectric dams on nonnavigable streams can be built only under
a permit from the circuit court of the county in which the dam is to be
located. 60 The original 1822 law required a permit for any type of dam across
any watercourse. 61 In 1835, the permit requirement was limited to any type
of dam across a nonnavigable stream, 62 probably because of the emergence
of federal authority over inland navigable waters. 63 At this time, there was
56.

Id. at 227-33.

57.

MO. REV. STAT. § 256.370 (1978).

58.

Comment of Larry Fellows, Missouri Geological Survey, to Author (Jan.

1978).
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. See MO. REV. STAT. § 256.370 (1978).
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 236.010-.500 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
1822 Mo. Laws 392.
MO. REV. STAT. § 1, at 406 (1835).

63. It was only in the 1820s that practical steamboats were developed which
could navigate the Mississippi, Ohio, and Missouri Rivers and their major
tributaries. In that period, similar language in the Northwest Ordinance, the
Missouri Territory Act, the Missouri Statehood Act, and the Missouri Constitution suggested strongly that dams and other obstructions should not be placed across
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no accepted legal definition of "navigable stream. "64 In later years, the
Missouri courts made it clear that the federal commercial navigability definition applied to the dam permit statute. 65 In 1905, the permit requirement
66
was further limited to milldams and hydroelectric dams.
navigable streams. The language is:
The Mississippi and Missouri rivers, and the navigable waters flowing into
them, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common
highways and forever free to the people of the said territory and to the
citizens of the United States, without any tax, duty or impost therefor.
Northwest Ordinance of 1789, art. IV, 1 Stat. 52 (1789); Missouri Territory Act,
S 15, 2 Stat. 747 (1812); Missouri Statehood Act, § 2, 3 Stat. 546 (1820); Mo.
CONST. art. X, 2 (1820).
The first federal activity on inland rivers was removal of snags and trees from
the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers by the Corps of Engineers under legislation in 1824.
Act of May 24, 1824, ch. 139, 4 Stat. 32-33 (1824). A host of navigation improvement project legislation followed, but the federal government did not begin to
regulate obstructions to navigation until specific bridge legislation in the 1850s. See
Wheeling Bridge Act of 1852, ch. 111, § 6, 10 Stat. 112 (1852), upheld in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 355 (1855). General
legislation regulating obstructions came in the late 19th century. See Rivers & Harbors Act of 1890, §§ 6-12, 26 Stat. 453-55 (1890); Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899,
33 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 (1976). See generally F.W. LAURENT, THE GROWTH OF
WATER-RESOURCES LAW UNDER THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM, chapter 3
(Water Resources Ctr., Univ. of Wis.-Madison 1977).
64. Federal authority over navigable waters was not expressly extended to inland waters until 1851. See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 233 (1851) (overruling prior cases limiting such jurisdiction to the high seas
and tidal waters).
65. See, e.g., Cambest v. McComas Hydro-Elec. Co., 212 Mo. App. 325,245
S.W. 598 (K.C. 1922). Waters are navigable under federal law if they are presently
being used for commercial navigation, have been so used in the past, or could be
so used in the future if reasonable improvements were made. See, e.g., United States
v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Economy Light & Power
Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557 (1870).
The Missouri courts have adopted the first proposition of the federal definition
of navigability-present commercial navigability-for bed title purposes. The standard federal definitional language has been adopted by the Missouri courts: "Those
rivers are navigable in law when they are used, or are susceptible of being used,
in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water."
Slovensky v. O'Reilly, 233 S.W. 478,481-82 (Mo. 1921). Hence, rivers that floated
saw logs in the past, or canoes and small boats presently, are not navigable. Elder
v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 829, 269 S.W.2d 17 (En Banc 1954). Those rivers may be
floatable and as such would be subject to the public easement of passage, however.
Id. Under its definition of navigability, the Missouri courts have held the Meramec
River in Crawford County to be nonnavigable for bed title purposes. Slovensky
v. O'Reilly, 233 S.W. at 481-82.
66. 1905 Mo. Laws 232.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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Today, a dam permit is obtained by petition to the circuit court of the
county in which the dam is to be located. 67 All dams, whether or not subject to the permit requirement, must contain a fish chute. 68 Dams built in
violation of the statute are enjoinable as public nuisances 69 and are liable
for double damages for injuries. 70 The permission for the dam ceases
whenever the state, county, or political subdivision of the state makes a con71
flicting improvement.
The statute also deals with abandoned dams. If a dam is at least 30 years
old, landowners abutting the impoundment within one mile of the dam have
the right to repair, maintain, and reconstruct the dam at their own expense
72
for their own purposes which were developed to use the impounded waters.
The right is in addition to the right recognized in equity that an impoundment, long in existence and on which the development of abutting lands occurred and depends, cannot be drained. The courts have held that reciprocal
negative easements to have the impoundment and dam maintained arise
out of reliance on the existence of the dam. This easement is enforceable
73
and justifies enjoining the draining of the impoundment.
C.

Diversions Not Subject to Statutory Regulation

Missouri does not have a comprehensive diversion regulatory statute
or a comprehensive impoundment licensing statute. It is not empowered
to protect the assimilative capacity of streams under the Clean Water Act,
even though that act does require the Clean Water Commission to establish
water quality standards for various reaches of streams, 74 which the Commission has done. Hence, the Commission cannot protect the assimilative
capacities that underly its water quality standards by regulating conflicting
diversions.
V.

DIVERSION PERMIT STATUTES IN THE EASTERN STATES

Fourteen of the thirty-one eastern states have statutes that control diversions of water from either surface watercourses or groundwater or both. The
principal purpose of those statutes is to allocate water between competing
users, particularly during shortages. Most were enacted in the late 1950s
or early 1960s, when temporary water shortages were experienced and
67.
68.
69.

MO. REV. STAT. § 236.030 (1978).

73.
74.

Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d 978 (1928).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 204.016(14) (1978) (definition), id. § 204.026(7)

Id. 5 236.230.
Id. - 236.240.
70. Id. § 236.270.
71. Id. 5 236.260.
72. Id. 5 236.255.

(establishment). The act merely prohibits waste discharges that would degrade water
quality below the established water quality standards, unless acting under a valid
permit. Id. § 204.051(2).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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chronic shortages were expected.7 5 The following sections examine the purposes and structures of the eastern state water diversion permit statutes, 76
two model acts, and the recommendation of the National Water
77
Commission.
A.

Purposes of Eastern Permit Statutes

The purposes set forth in the policy sections of the eastern water diversion permit statutes vary widely from state to state. Those purposes include
allocating water among competing users, 78 promoting beneficial and efficient uses of water, 79 assuring the best use of water in the public interest, 80
dealing with water shortages, 81 protecting public water supplies, 8 2 protec75. See Champion, PriorAppropriation in Mississippi-A Statutory Analysis, 39
MISS. L.J. 1, 1 (1967); Hines, A Decade of Experience under the Iowa Water Permit
System-Part 1, 7 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 499, 508-10 (1967).
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§21-1301 to-1332 (1968 &Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6060 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
373.106-.191 (1974 & Gum. Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-502, 17-510.1

(1971 & Cum. Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-1-1 to -2-29-2 (Bums 1981);
IOWA CODE §§ 455A. 1-.40 (1979); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 151.100-.990 (1980); MD.
NAT. RES. CODEANN. §5 8-101 to -407 (1974 &Cum. Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 105.37-.81 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to
-3-55, -4-1 to -4-19 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1A-2 to
-17 (1982); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-0503 to -2723 (McKinney 1973

& Cum. Supp. 1981-1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.11 to .61(1978 &Supp.
1979); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 30.18 (West 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). On eastern
permit systems, see generally Heath, WaterManagement Legislation in the Eastern States,
2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 99 (1967); Plager & Maloney, EmergingPattemsforRegula-

tion of Consumptive Use of Water in Eastern United States, 43 IND. L.J. 383 (1968).
77. MODEL WATER USE ACT (1958)(hereinafter MODEL WATER USE ACT),
in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 533 (Univ. of Mich. Law School 1958); F.

MALONEY, R. AUSNESS &J. MORRIS, A MODEL WATER CODE (1972) (hereinafter
MODEL WATER CODE); NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR

THE FUTURE, chapter 7, § F, at 280 (June 1973) (hereinafter NWC REPORT).
78. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1301 (1968); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.110(1980);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 143-215.13

(a) (1978). Cf. GA. CODEANN. § 17-502 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (purpose to maximize
benefits to users).
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6001(a) (2)-(3) (1974); IND. CODE ANN. §
13-2-1-1 (Burns 1981); IOWA CODE § 455A.2 (1979); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.110
(1980); MISS. CODE ANN. §51-3-1 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.12 (1978).
80. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, §6001(a) (3), (a)(6), (b), (c) (1) (1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 373.016(2) (b) (1974); GA. CODEANN. § 17-502 (Cum. Supp. 1981); IND.
CODE ANN. § 13-2-1-1 (Burns 1981); IOWA CODE § 455A.2 (1979); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 151.110 (1980); MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-203 (1974 &Cur. Supp. 1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 5 58:1A-5 (1982).
81. ARK. STAT. ANN. §21-1301(1968); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.110(1980);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.13(a) (1978).
82. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38(1) (1977).
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ting minimum streamflows, 83 promoting flood control,8 4 promoting water
86
conservation, 8 5 and establishing state comprehensive water planning.

B.

Waters Subject to Permit Requirements

Most eastern permit statutes regulate diversions and in-place uses of both
surface watercourses and groundwater.8 7 A few are limited to surface watercourses only. 88 Two of the comprehensive permit statutes also apply to diffused surface water,8 9 but most expressly exempt diffused surface water from
regulation.9" Other typical exemptions include farm ponds,91 surface watercourses located on single ownership tracts, 92 and springs.9 3 Because surface
watercourses and groundwater are usually hydrologically connected, most
commentators recommend that both be regulated as a single entity.9 4
83. ARK. STAT. ANN. §21-1301 (1968); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, §6001(a) (4),
(c) (3) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.016(2) (e)-(f) (1974); KY. REV. STAT. §
151.110 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38(1)(1977). One state is concerned with

protecting the pollution assimilative capacity of watercourses. See GA. CODE ANN.
5 17-502 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
84. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1301 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.016(2) (d)
(1974); IOWA CODE § 455A.2 (1979); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.110 (1980); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 105.38(1) (1977).
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1301 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.016(2) (c)
(1974); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.110 (1980).
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6001(a) (7) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5
373.016(2) (a) (1974).
87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6002(7), (22); 6003(a) (3), (b) (4) (1974); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 373.019(9)-(12); 373.023(1) (1974); IOWA CODE § 455A. 18 (1979);
KY. REV. STAT. §§ 151.120(1), .150 (1980); MD. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 8-101(k),
-802(a) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.37(7), .41(1),
.416(1) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1982); MISS. CODEANN. §§51-3-7(1),-4-1(2),-4-5(1),

-4-7(1), -4-9 (Cum. Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:4A-2 (1982); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-215.13 to .15, .21(7) (1978).
88. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1302 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(1) (d)
(1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(1) (a), .18 (2) (1973).

89.

DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, §§ 6002(7); 6003(a) (3), (b)(4) (1974); FLA. STAT.

ANN. §§ 373.019(9), (11), .023(1) (1974).
90. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§21-1302(b), -1310(a) (1968); IOWA CODE §455A.27
(1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 151.120(2) (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.37(7)
(1977); MISS. CODEANN. § 51-3-40(1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §58:1-35(F) (1982).
91. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, §6029(2)-(3)(1974); GA. CODEANN. § 17-510.1(1)

(Gum. Supp. 1981); MISS. CODEANN. § 51-3-7(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981). One state
expressly regulates farm ponds. See MD. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 8-101(k),-802(a) (1974
& Cum. Supp. 1981).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6029(1) (1974); GA. CODEANN. § 17-510. 1(1)(d)
(Gum. Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.27 (1971).
93. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1310(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 51-3-7(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
94. C. CORKER, supranote 41, at 147; A. PIPER, INTERPRETATION AND CURRENT STATUS OF GROUNDWATER RIGHTS (U.S. Geological Survey Circ. No. 432
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Activities Subject to Permit Requirements

Eastern permit statutes generally regulate diversions from surface
watercourses, 95 impoundments on surface watercourses, 96 and wells and
diversions from groundwater. 9 7 A few states with many lakes also regulate
lake levels. 98 A few regulate fills and encroachments into watercourses99 and
channel changes. 100 Most states exempt diversions for domestic purposes, 101
1960); H. THOMAS, THE CONSERVATION OF GROUND WATER 243-47 (1951); H.
THOMAS, GROUND WATER AND THE LAW (U.S. Geological Survey Circ. No. 446
1961); Ausness, Water Use Permits in a RiparianState: Problemsand Proposals,66 KY.
L.J. 191, 220-21 (1978); Davis, Wells andStreams: Relationshipat Law, supra note 47,
at 193-97; Piper & Thomas, supra note 41, at 7. The model acts have followed that
recommendation. MODEL WATER USE ACT, supra note 77, §§ 102(s), 103,401(a);
MODEL WATER CODE §§ 1.03(8)-(10), 1.04(1) (1972). The National Water Commission recommends regulation of both surface watercourses and ground water.
NWC REPORT, supra note 77, Recommendation 7-47.
95. ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 21-1308 (1968); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, §6003(a) (3),
(b) (4) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.216, .219 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1982); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE § 455A.1,.18, .19
(1979); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.140(1980); MD. NAT. RES. CODE §8-802(a) (1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §5 105.41(1), .416(1)(1977 &Cum. Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 51-3-7(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:1-37 (1982); N.C. GEN.
STAT. 5 143-215.15(a) (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(1) (b), (3)(a) (West 1973).
96. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1304, -1306.A (Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6003 (a) (6), (b) (4); 6010(f) (2) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.413(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981); IOWA
CODE § 455A. 19 (1979); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 151.210(1), .250(1) (1981); MD. NAT.
RES. CODE §§ 8-802(a), -803(a) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 105.42(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-39(1) (Cum. Supp.
1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:16A-52, -55 (1982); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 15-0503(1) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1981-1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143-215.15(a) (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 31.05 (West 1973).
97. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, §§6002(1); 6003(a) (3), (a) (6), (b) (4) (1974); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 373.306, .313, .326 (1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2-5 (Bums
1981); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.140 (1981); MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-604 (Cum.
Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5§ 105.37(7), .41(1), .416(1) (1977); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 51-4-1(2), -5(1), -7(1), -9 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:4A-14 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§143-215.13 to .15, .21(7) (1978 & Supp.
1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.025(2) (e) (West 1973).
98. IND. CODE ANN. §5 13-2-11-2, -12-1, -14-3, -14-5, -18-1 (Bums 1981);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.42(la) (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. §31.02(1) (West 1973).
99. KY. REV. STAT. § 151.250(3)(1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §58:16A-52, -55(1982); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-0503(1) (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1981-1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.19(1) (West 1973).
100. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.42(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982); NJ. STAT. ANN. 5
58:16A-52, -55 (1982); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-0501, -0505 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1981-1982); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 30.19(1),. 195(1) (West 1973).
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.219(1) (1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-1-3(j)
(Burns 1981); IOWA CODE §§ 455A.1, .25 (1979); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 151.140,
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which are drinking water, livestock water, and household water. One state
exempts water for irrigating household gardens. 102 Three states exempt all
agricultural diversions, including for irrigation.10 3 Two states exempt diversions for public water supplies.104 Other exemptions include small
impoundments, 10 5 small diversions, 1 0 6 water for oil and gas recovery
08

operations, 10 7 and water for steam power plants.
All activities that have a significant effect on the volume, rate, or pattern of flow in surface watercourses and the availability and water table of
groundwater should be regulated under a permit system. Those are the activities that will have the greatest impact on the availability of water for consumptive and nonconsumptive uses and on the maintenance of flow and
water levels in surface watercourses for fish and wildlife habitat and recrea-.
tional uses. Therefore, the obvious candidates for regulation are diversions,
impoundments, and major wells.10 9
Although most of the recognized exemptions involve small diversions
that will have little or no effect on the overall availability of water,110 exemptions for agriculture and public water supplies should not be created.
Both involve large diversions. Agricultural irrigation can be as much as eighty
percent consumptive. Because most of the fears concerning availability of
water and streamflow maintenance in Missouri are based on the massive
unregulated growth of supplemental irrigation, exempting agricultural diversions would prevent diversion regulation from solving the very problem it
is designed to avoid.
210(1) (1981); MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-802(b) (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN.
105.41(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-3(c), -7(1) (1972 & Cum.
Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1-37 (1982).
102. MIss. CODE ANN. 55 51-3-3(c), -7(1) (1972 &Cum. Supp. 1981).
103. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981); KY. REV. STAT. 5
151.140 (1981); MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-802(b) (1974).
104. MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-802(b) (1974); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:1A-7
(1982). But cf id. § 58: 1A-12 (regulates municipal condemnation of water rights).
105. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1310(e) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (under20 acres); MD.
NAT. RES. CODE § 8-803(b) (1974) (ponds under 640 acres).
106. Miss. CODE ANN. 5 51-4-9(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (groundwater under
50,000 gpd); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:4A-2 (1982) (groundwater under 100,000 gpd);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.13(d)(2) (1978) (under 10,000 gpd); id. 5143-215.15(a)
(certain diversions under 100,000 gpd).
107. KY. REV. STAT. 5151.140(1981); MISS. CODEANN. §51-4-1(2) (1972).
108. Ky. REV. STAT. 5151.140 (1981).
109. The model acts provide for regulating all major diversions. MODEL
WATER USEACT, supra note 77, §§ 102(s), 103,401(a); MODEL WATER CODE, supra

note 77, 55 2.01(1), 3.30(1), 3.10-.11. The National Water Commission recommends regulating all withdrawals. NWC REPORT, supranote 77, Recommendation 7-47.
110. MODEL WATER USE ACT, supranote 77, §§207 & 301(a) exempt domestic
diversions, while the MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, makes no exemptions.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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D. Allocation of Water
The way in which water is allocated by the various state agencies determines the degree to which the stated purposes of the eastern diversion permit statutes are accomplished. Among those purposes are the protection of
streamflows and the equitable and beneficial allocation of water in the public
interest. Some statutes specifically outline priorities in allocating water; most
merely provide a policy orientation for allocation. Thus, most administering agencies determine allocation priorities without the benefit of specific
statutory guidance.
1. Policy Orientation for Allocating Water
Almost all of the eastern diversion permit statutes provide policy guidance
for allocating water among competing users. Those guidelines are broad
benchmarks that are to be used either to establish more explicit priorities
administratively or to make allocation decisions on a case-by-case basis. The
statutory policy guidance is to be used to establish the balance between protected streamflows and waters available for allocation, to allocate water between competing users, and to determine the sizes of and conditions attached
to permitted diversions.
The policy guidelines provided in the various statutes include allocation of water in the public interest,111 allocation based on comparative public
benefits,112 allocation based on reasonable beneficial uses by users,' 13 fair
share allocation among users,114 and allocation based on state comprehen5
11
sive water planning.

These policy guidelines serve two purposes. First, they provide a public
policy framework to justify the regulation of diversions under the state's police
power. As such, the policy guidelines help create a constitutional basis for
the permit statutes. Second, the policy guidelines create a framework within
which the administrative allocation decisions take place. They do not leave
111. FLA. STAT. ANN. §5 373.223(1)(c), .233(1) (1974); IND. CODE ANN. §
13-2-2-5 (Burns 1981); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.170(2)(1981); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
§ 8-807(a) (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.45 (Cum. Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 51-3-13, -35(1); -4-9(3) (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1981); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 15-0503(3)(a)(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1981-1982); N.C. GEN. STAT.
5§ 143-215.14(a)(2), (c);. 16(e)-(f) (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(5) (West 1973)
(by implication).
112. MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-807(a) (1974).
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.223(1) (a) (1974); IOWA CODE 5§ 455A.1, .21-.22
(1979); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.170(2) (1981); Miss. CODEANN. §551- 3 -3 (g), -7(1),
-13 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
114. ARK. STAT. ANN. §21-1308(1968); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, 56010(f) (1)
(1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(6) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
115. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, § 6010(b) (1974); IOWA CODE 5 455A. 17 (1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.39(1), .41(a), .42(a), .44(8) (West 1977 & Cum. Supp.
1982).
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the diversion regulatory process to the unfettered discretion of the administering agencies, but help increase the consistency and equity of the administrative decisions. The guidelines establish the proper balance between
competing public and private interests in the allocation decisions and avoid
the problem of excessive delegation of legislative authority. They help create
a constitutional basis for the individual allocation decisions just as they do
for the authority to regulate itself, both from the perspective of proper regulation under the police power and of equal protection.
Because of the desirability of including policy guidelines in diversion
permit statutes, all the states except New Jersey expressly provide policy
116
guidelines of some sort that are directly applicable to the allocation process.
does provide policy guidance for its water legislation
New Jersey, however,
7
whole."
a
as
2.

Factors to be Considered in Allocating Water

A few state legislatures have gone a step beyond the general policy
guidelines just discussed and have elaborated on the factors the administering
agency should examine in making an allocation decision. These factors concern the factual questions the agency must address rather than the specification of allocation priorities.
Georgia and North Carolina have established the same list of factors,
which are:
(1) the number persons using the particular water source, and the
object, extent and necessity of their respective withdrawals or
uses;
(2) the nature and size of the water source;
(3) the physical and chemical nature of any impairment of the
water source, adversely affecting its availability or fitness for
other water uses;
(4) the probable severity and duration of such impairment under
foreseeable conditions;
(5) the injury to public health, safety, or welfare that would result
if such impairment were not prevented or abated;
(6) the kinds of businesses or activities to which the various uses
are related and the economic consequences;
116.

The model acts provide that allocations should be made in the public in-

terest and that reasonable beneficial use should be the allocative criterion. MODEL
WATER USE ACT, supra note 77, §§ 207, 407(a)-(b), 407(d); MODEL WATER CODE,

supra note 77, §§ 2.02(1) (a), 2.02(1) (c), 2.05(1). The latter act also requires allocations to be consistent with the state water plan. Id. §§ 1.07(10), 2.02(3). The National Water Commission rejects public interest and conformance with state water
plans as factors for allocating water. It feels the former concept is too vague and
the latter too subject to abuse to be suitable criteria. NWC REPORT, supra note 77,

at 284.
117.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1A-5 (1982).
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the importance and necessity of the uses claimed by permit applicants and the extent of any injury or detriment caused or
expected to be caused to other water uses;
(8) diversion from or reduction of flows in other watercourses; and
(9) other relevant factors."1
This list of factors is very similar to lists recited by courts in riparian rights
cases. 11 9 Any administering agency, of practical necessity, would consider
these factors in making allocation decisions, whether or not so directed by
statute.
3.

Express Allocation Priorities

A few state legislatures apparently concluded that general policy
guidelines of the type discussed above are too broad and ill-defined to give
the administering agency adequate guidance. In two states, agency discretion is limited by allocation priority in the statutes.
Arkansas established a list of priorities for allocating water during
shortages. 120 Where users of different types compete, some users are preferred
over others based on the following priority list: (1) uses sustaining life, (2)
121
uses maintaining health, and (3) uses increasing wealth.
Minnesota's priority list is more explicit. It applies to all diversions,
whether or not a shortage exists, and applies at the time competing applications are filed.122 Uses are preferred according to the following list: (1)
domestic uses and large agricultural diversions (over 10,000 gallons per day
(gpd)), (2) all small diversions (under 10,000 gpd), (3) large power production uses (over 10,000 gpd), (4) large industrial and commercial uses (over
1 23
10,000 gpd), and (5) other large uses (over 10,000 gpd).
It may be wise to include a list of allocative priorities in a diversion permit statute. This is especially true if existing uses are not necessarily to be
preferred over new uses. The general policy guidelines discussed above do
not suggest how to allocate water when difficult choices have to be made.
Are industrial and commercial uses to be preferred over agricultural uses?
Should a more efficient upstream use be preferred over a less efficient use
of the same type downstream? Should nonconsumptive hydroelectric uses
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(5) (Cum. Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143-215.15(h) (1978).
119. See, e.g., Gehlen Bros. v. Knorr, 101 Iowa 700, 70 N.W. 757 (1897); Willis
v. City of Perry, 92 Iowa 297, 60 N.W. 727 (1894); Red River Roller Mills v.
Wright, 30 Minn. 249, 15 N.W. 167 (1883); Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161
(Mo. 1964); Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900); Dunlap
v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43 (1938); Timm v. Bear,
29 Wis. 254 (1871); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 850A (1979).
120. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1308 (1968).
121. Id.
122. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
123. Id.
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be preferred over consumptive irrigation uses? Should new uses have access to a fully allocated water resource? Should they be required to buy the
rights of existing conflicting uses, or should the administering agency give
them entry by refusing to renew the permits of the existing conflicting users?
The guidelines do not answer these questions or the host of analogous questions that arise when a chronic water shortage develops. Use priorities will
answer some allocation questions that otherwise are left to the unfettered
determination of the administering agency. Because basic economic and
social issues are involved in answering fundamental water allocation questions, the legislature should make these allocation policy decisions.
It is not surprising that few eastern diversion permit statutes contain
allocation priorities. In times of water surplus, when only future shortages
are feared, the legislature may not be able to come to a concensus about
allocation priorities or even realize that they must be established. -Hence,
the legislature considers the entire allocation process, including making basic
allocation policy decisions, as one involving administrative expertise.
Although leaving these decisions to the agency eventually may prove to be
an improper delegation of legislative authority, causing the diversion permit system to be held unconstitutional, no allocation problems have arisen
in the eastern states yet because the feared shortages have not developed. 1 2 4
There has been no need to resolve the difficult allocation questions that could
cause litigation over the constitutionality of the permit statutes.
4.

Time Priorities:

Prior Appropriation

A fundamental issue that must be decided in drafting a diversion permit statute is whether existing uses are to be preferred over new uses. This
issue can arise in the context of competing new use applications and renewal
applications, temporary water shortages, and modification of permits to allow
entry of new uses.
Advocates of the prior appropriation system of the western states offer
it as a solution for this problem. 125 The prior appropriation doctrine pro124. Only Iowa has been forced to limit new diversions and to restrict old ones,
and then only during the drought of the mid-1970s. This took the form of diversion rate limitations. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 580-3.4 (1978).
125. See, e.g., NWC REPORT, supra note 77, Recommendation 7-53; Coates,

Presentand ProposedLegal Control of Water Resources in Wisconsin, 1953 WIS. L. REV.
256; Trelease, The Model Water Code, the WiseAdministratorandthe Goddam Bureaucrat,
14 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 207 (1974); ProposedSurface WaterLawforMichigan,in THE
LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 49 (D. Haber &
S. Bergen ed. 1958); note 179 infra. See also Trelease, Alternatives to AppropriationLaw,
6 DENVERJ. INT'L L. & POLICY 283 (1977), reprintedin WATER NEEDS FOR THE
FUTURE 59 (V. Nanda ed. 1977); Trelease, A Model State Water Codefor River Basin
Development, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 301 (1957); Trelease, New WaterLawsfor
Old and New Countries, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN WATER LAW 40 (C.
Johnson & S. Lewis ed. 1970); Trelease, New Water Legislation: Drafting for
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vides that a landowner's right to divert water is based on historic use. The
oldest historic use has the strongest right and the newest use has the weakest
right. When a water shortage exists, water is allocated to the diverters in
the order of seniority of right, until the supply is consumed. "First in time,
first in right" is the maxim of the prior appropriation doctrine. The prior
appropriation right is limited to man-made diversions from streams or manmade obstructions for mills and hydroelectric dams, for application of the
water to particular land for an economically beneficial purpose. Appropria1 26
tions for public water supply purposes also are recognized.
The purpose of the western prior appropriation system is to create a
security of water right not found in the riparian rights system of the eastern
states. Riparianism presumes an abundance of water and permits the entry of new water users to the abundant water supply because each water user
is entitled to his fair share. It is designed to resolve the occasional water rights
disputes that arise in local situations of heavy demand on a finite water supply
or during temporary water shortages. It cannot cope with the chronic water
shortages, heavy demands for water by irrigators and miners, and scarce
water supplies prevalent in the western states.
Prior appropriation evolved to create an absolutely secure water right
under such western circumstances by giving the earlier diverters a priority
of right over the later diverters if there is insufficient water for both for any
reason. By contrast, the riparian doctrine gives all users an equal right of
access to the water supply. It usually requires that they share water shortages as determined by court decision or by contract between the parties on
a case-by-case basis. The riparian water right is much more adaptable to
changing patterns in water demand, but at the expense of insecurity of water
right.
The principal defect of prior appropriation is the result of its primary
virtue. The absolute security of water right held by the senior appropriators
makes it very difficult to establish new uses. Because most western streams
are fully appropriated, the only way for a new user to gain access to the water
supply is to buy the right of an existing appropriator. And he may not be
willing to sell. There is no mechanism by which his water right can be shifted
to a new use against his will. Many western states also require protection
of other appropriators incidentally affected by the transfer, if the transfer
involves a change of place of diversion, place of use, or type of use. 127 They
can block a transfer.
Developments, Efficient Allocation and EnvironmentalProtection, 12 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 385 (1977); Trelease, PoliciesforWaterLaw: PropertyRights, EconomicForces,and
Public Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 1 (1965).
126. See generally Davis, supranote 22, at 688-89; Fisher, Western Experience and
Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE
EASTERN UNITED STATES 75, 81-85 (D. Haber & S. Bergen ed. 1958).
127. This comparison of the riparian rights and prior appropriation systems
is discussed more fully in MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, at 157-59; Davis,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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Only one eastern state, Mississippi, has established a prior appropriation permit system.128 The Mississippi statute is a true western-type prior
appropriation system because it provides for appropriation for a beneficial
use 29 and makes the appropriative right perpetual as long as the beneficial
use is continued. 130 Although the statute does not expressly provide that only
unappropriated water is subject to new appropriations, the very use of the
word "appropriate" throughout the statute, which is not found in other
eastern statutes, makes clear that Mississippi has adopted the western prior
appropriation concept.
Two other eastern statutes prefer a renewal application over an application for a new use when they are otherwise equal,'13 1 but both are coupled
with a maximum time period of permit duration when renewal is
discretionary.1 32 This combination of provisions permits the administering
agency to prefer a new use over an existing one at the latter's time of renewal
if that is in the public interest. Hence, the characteristic absolute time priority
of prior appropriation is absent.
Substitution of new uses for old ones at the time of permit renewal is
recommended by the commentators as more appropriate for the eastern
states. 133 They expressly recommend against use of the prior appropriation
concept. 134 Prior appropriation has not been responsive enough to the need
for new water uses. 135 The need for a water right more secure than that prosupra note 22, at 675-97; Fisher, supranote 126, at 76-87. On the problem of security
of right under the riparian doctrine, see also Plager, Some Observations on the Law of
WaterAllocation as a Variable in IndustrialSite Location, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 673; Plager
& Maloney, EmergingPatternsforRegulation ofConsumptive Use of Water in Eastern United
States, 43 IND. L.J. 383 (1968).
128. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to -53 (1972). At least eight eastern states have

rejected prior appropriation bills: Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Michigan, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. MODEL WATER CODE,
supra note 77, at 76 nn.50-58.
129. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51- 3 -3 (g) (1) (1972).
130.
131.
132.

Id. §§ 51-3-11, -29.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.233(2) (1974); IOWA CODE § 455A.21 (1979).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.236 (1974) (20 years); IOWA CODE § 455A.20

(1979) (10 years; 1 year for irrigation permits). During the term of the permit, it
is a protected use. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.133(1)(b) (1974); IOWA CODE

§

455A.20, .28 (1979).
133. MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, at 173-75; Ausness, supra note 94,
at 235; Davis, supranote 22, at 701. The model acts also combine a preference for

renewals of equal benefit with permits of specific duration. MODEL WATER USE
ACT, supranote 77, §§ 406 (50 years), 410 (compulsory termination to enable entry
of a more beneficial use); MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, §§ 2.05(2), 2.06(1)

(20 years).
134. MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, at 156-59; Davis, supra note 22, at
692-94.
135. MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, at 159; Davis, supra note 22, at

693-94; Lauer, supra note 13, at 17.
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vided by common law riparian rights can be achieved by granting permits
with a time duration sufficient to amortize investments, as is discussed in
the next section. This method of providing security of water right allows for
timely and gradual shifts in uses.
Another problem with prior appropriation is its ineffectiveness in areas
where a substantial number of pre-enactment diversions and uses exist. All
such pre-existing diversions and uses are vested rights and must be granted
permits. 136 Those pre-existing uses acquire an equal priority; conflicts between them are resolved on riparian principles. If the prior appropriation
doctrine exists at the beginning of a development, the vested rights doctrine
does not create a problem. In a state that adopts prior appropriation late,
however, experience has shown that the old system continues to control water
allocation for most users. For example, in Mississippi, about ninety percent of the diversions under permit ten years after enactment consisted of
vested rights with equal priority. 137 In areas with substantial pre-existing
water diversion development, prior appropriation has proven ineffective. 138
Thus, even assuming that the prior appropriation doctrine has merit, it is
too late to substitute it in the eastern states. 13 9
E.

Security of Water Right versus Accommodation of New Users

The major defect of common law riparian rights and of the common
law groundwater allocation rules is the insecurity of right. One of the primary
purposes of the eastern diversion permit statutes is to provide security of
right. Nonetheless, the legislatures wished to preserve the ability of the
riparian system to accommodate new uses. Hence, they did not adopt prior
appropriation, which creates a secure water right at the expense of establishment of new uses. Instead, they established permit systems with terms sufficient to allow amortization of investments in water use facilities. By allowing
for permit renewal at the discretion of the administering agency, a mechanism
was created for the entry of new uses and their substitution for old uses. 140
1. Permit Duration and Renewal
Seven of the fourteen eastern permit statutes provide for fixed term permits. Permit terms provided by the various statutes include maximums of
ten years 41 and twenty years. 142 Three states established a fifty year term
136.

See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).

137. Champion, supra note 75, at 16-19.
138. Davis, supra note 22, at 661-62.
139. Id. at 690-91. The National Water Commission disagrees and recommends
adoption of prior appropriation for allocating water among postenactment users.
NWC REPORT, supra note 77, Recommendation 7-53(b).
140. MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, at 173-75.
141. IOWA CODE § 455A.20 (1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-4-11(11) (Cum.
Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.16(a) (1978).
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. §373.236 (1974); GA. CODEANN. §17-510.1(8)(Cum.
Supp. 1981).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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for the facilities of public water supplies and public utilities. 143 Seven states
apparently grant permits in perpetuity, 144 but two of those states require
a frequent review of diversions and make the permits subject to
cancellation. 145 The commentators recommend the use of fixed term permits without an automatic renewal right, but disagree over the length of the
term. 146
2.

Efficiency, Diligence, and Nonuse

Two other methods to assist the entry of new uses have been borrowed
from the western prior appropriation doctrine. One method is to require
existing permittees to efficiently use the water allocated to them. The administering agency will not allocate more water to applicants than they need
for their respective uses. If technological efficiencies improve, the size of those
allocations can be reduced at renewal time. Some of the eastern permit
statutes have efficient use provisions, 147 but only one indicates how that man1
date is to be applied.

48

The second way to assist entry of new uses is to provide for forfeiture
of unused water rights. Typically, the forfeiture concept involves two provisions. First, the permittee must initiate his diversion relatively quickly after
the permit has been granted. If he fails to begin the use within that time,
his permit is forfeited. Several eastern statutes have such diligence
provisions. 149 Second, if the permittee ceases a use for a specified period of
time, his permit is forfeited. While some western prior appropriation statutes
143. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306A(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 373.236 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(8) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
144. Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and
Wisconsin.
145. MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-811 (1974) (triennial review); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 30.18(5) (West 1973) (annual review).
146. MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, at 173-74, 175, 189 (20 years);
Ausness, supra note 94, at 235, 256-62 (30 years). MODELWATER USEACT, supra
note 77, 5 406 provides for a 15-year permit term, while MODEL WATER CODE,
supranote 77, 5 2.06(1) provides for a 20-year term, with a 50-year term for public
water supply and public utility facilities. The National Water Commission recommends use of fixed term permits. NWC REPORT, supra note 77, Recommendation
7-51. Renewal should be automatic unless the water is needed for a higher public
purpose. Id. That is consistent with its recommendation that prior appropriation
be employed for allocating water among postenactment users. See id., Recommendation 7-53(b).
147. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(11) (f) (Cum. Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE §§
455A. 1, .22 (1979); MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-811 (1974); MISS. CODE ANN. §
51-3-3(e) (1972).
148. MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-811 (1974) (triennial review ofpermitted uses).
149. MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-810(1974) (diversions-2 years; dams-5 years);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.46 (1977) (5 years); MISS. CODE ANN. §5 51-3-29(b),
-35(1) (1972) (reasonable period).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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require a showing of an intent to give up the water right, the eastern statutes
follow the lead of other prior appropriation statutes and do not require such
a showing. Several eastern statutes have such forfeiture provisions. The time
period is either two years 150 or three years.1 51 The commentators recommend forfeiture for nonuse,1 52 but do not mention diligence provisions even
though diligence is implicit in the concept of beneficial use they

recommend. 153
3.

Transfer of Permits

Another way to build flexibility into a permit system is to allow transfer
of permits to diverters in other locations, as is allowed in the western states.
Permit transfer in the eastern states could serve two purposes. First, as in
prior appropriation states, new users could buy out existing ones when the
available water supplies are fully allocated. Second, new users could bypass
the administering agency's permit substitution procedures and the risk that
the substitute permit would be issued to another new user. Transferable permits give new users the option of purchasing already permitted use rights
rather than seeking new or substitute use rights.
Few eastern diversion permit statutes allow transfer of permit use rights
to new locations or uses.1 54 Mississippi, 155 which adopted the prior appropriation concept, needed transfer provisions for the same reasons as the western
states. Presumably, the legislatures in the states that do not provide for
transfer rights decided that all new uses should be expressly allocated by the
normal permit procedures and that bypassing the administering agency by
purchasing existing use rights was undesirable. Only four statutes expressly
authorize transfer of permit rights to new owners of land on which permitted uses occur, even though permit rights probably are appurtenant to the
150. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.243(4) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1982); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-510.1(11) (d) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
151. IOWA CODE §455A.29 (1979) (3-year extension maybe applied for); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-11, -29(c) (1972) (no extension provision).

152. MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, at 192; Davis, supranote 22, at 699.
MODEL WATER USE ACT, supra note 77, § 306 provides for forfeiture after 4 to 7
years have elapsed, while MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, § 2.08(4) provides
for forfeiture after 2 years. The National Water Commission recommends forfeiture
for nonuse. NWC REPORT, supra note 77, Recommendation 7-50.
153. MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, at 170-73; Ausness, supra note 94,
at 234-35; Davis, supra note 22, at 698-99. The National Water Commission recommends employment of the efficiency and diligence concepts. NWC REPORT, supra
note 77, at 284.
For definitions of beneficial use that incorporate efficiency criteria, see MODEL
WATER USE ACT, supra note 77, §§ 207, 407(a)-(b), 407(d); MODEL WATER CODE,
supra note 77, § 2.02(1) (a).
154. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-45(1), -4-11(2) (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5
58:1A-8 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.16(b) (1978).
155. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-45(1) (1972) (watercourses).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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land. 156 Although most legal commentators do not discuss transfer of permit rights, 157 it should be addressed in any new eastern diversion permit
statutes.

58

F.

Minimum Streamfiows

One of the stated purposes of some of the eastern permit statutes is protecting minimum streamflows for fish and wildlife habitat and recreation
purposes. 159 Those statutes and a few others expressly empower the administering agency to establish such minimum streamflows and prohibit the0
agency from allocating water for diversions from those protected flows.16

or from
Some statutes also prohibit all diversions from certain named streams
16
administratively designated streams, such as trout streams.'
Some of the streamflow protection provisions provide a formula for ascertaining the amount of the protected flow. Such statutory formulae include
flow sufficient to protect rights of lower riparians and to protect dependent
fish and wildlife, 162 average minimum flow for seven consecutive days within
the lowest flow year of record,163 average minimum daily flow during each
of the five lowest years during the preceding twenty years, 164 twenty-five
156. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306A(5) (Cum. Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE §
455A.30 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41(6) (Cum. Supp. 1981); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 58:1A-8(9) (1982).
157. But see Ausness, supra note 94, at 236.
158. The National Water Commission recommends that permits be freely
transferable. NWC REPORT, supranote 77, Recommendation 7-54. Some economic
and legal commentators recommend market place systems for the allocation and
transfer of water rights. SeeJ. HIRSHLEIFER,J. DEHAVEN &J. MILLIMAN, WATER
SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY, chapters III, IV, IX, XII

(1960); Ausness, supra note 94, at 262-64; Davis, supra note 22, at 705-09; Gaffney, Comparison of Market Pricing and Other Means of Allocating Water Resources, -in
WATER LAW AND POLICY IN THE SOUTHEAST 195, 200 (Inst. of Law & Gov't,
Univ. of Ga., 1962); Johnson, An Optimal State Water Law: Fixed Water Rights and
FlexibleMarket Prices, 57 VA. L. REV. 345 (1971); Lauer, supranote 13, at 20-21; Levi,
Highest andBest Use: An Economic Goalfor Water Law, 34 Mo. L. REV. 165 (1969);
Milliman, Water Law and PrivateDecision Making: A Critique, 2 J. L. & ECON. 41
(1959).
159. See note 83 supra.
160. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306A(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL. CODEANN.
tit. 7, 5§ 6029(1)-(2), 6031 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (by implication); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 373.042, .223 (3) (1974); IOWA CODE §§455A. 1, .18, .22, .24 (1979);MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 105.417(2)-(3) (Gum. Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-3(i)

to (j), -7(3) to (4) (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §58: 1A-3 (1982);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 31.34 (West 1973).
161. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.417(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN.

§ 30.18(5) (West 1973),
162. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306A(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
163. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6029(1)-(2) (1974).
164. MiSS. CODEANN. § 51-3-3(i) (1972). Minimum waterlevels are calculated
the same
Id. of
§ Missouri
51-3-30).
Published
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percent of natural low stream flow. 165 In the remainder of the states protecting streamflows, the administering agency must determine the amount of
protected flow without statutory guidance. 166 In states without statutory provisions concerning protection of minimum streamflows, the administering
agencies can protect such flows by refusing to grant diversion permits that
would encroach on them.
Maintenance of minimum streamflows is vital to the continued existence
of fish and other aquatic fauna and flora and to enable use of navigable and
floatable streams for various recreational purposes, such as boating, fishing,
swimming, and hunting. Even at common law, no abutting landowner had
the right to take all of the water in a stream. Although a right to unaltered
flow is not recognized by the courts today and although there may be no
downstream riparian to enforce the prohibition against total diversion of
67
flows, the common law still bans total diversions.1
The streamflow protection provisions in the eastern permit statutes
enable the administering agencies to protect public rights and to enforce and
quantify the common law prohibition. Most commentators recommend that
minimum streamflow provisions be incorporated into diversion permit
legislation for these reasons. 168 No diversion permit statute should be enacted
without a streamflow protection provision.
G.

Other Permit Provisions

Permits generally specify the diversion location,'

69

the vol-

165. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 31.34 (West 1973).
166. In Iowa, the administering agency has established the minimum flow level
as that elevation which is equal to or exceeded by the stream in question at least
84% of the time between April and September in years representative of normal
conditions. Hines, supra note 75, at 541-42.
167. See, e.g., Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 486-87, 234
A.2d 825, 831 (1967).
168. Ausness, supranote 94, at 240; Davis, supranote 22, at 701-02; Hines, supra
note 75, at 536-46. MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, §§ 1.07(4)-(7), 2.09(7)
contain a streamflow protection provision for the administering agency to establish
the amount of protected flow. The National Water Comission recommends that
minimum streamflows and lake levels be established according to standards which
incorporate considerations of public health, ecological values, recreational use,
aesthetics, including private investment in scenic values, and alternate values of
the water for municipal, industrial and agricultural uses. NWC REPORT, supranote
77, Recommendation 7-52. Two levels of minimum flows are recommended: (1)
"desirable minimum flows" to be preserved under average conditions of supply
and to be protected from postenactment permitted diversions, and (2) "essential
minimum flows" to be preserved under all conditions and to be protected even from
pre-enactment diversions. NWC REPORT, supra note 77, at 287, 289.
169. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306A(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 373.229(h) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981); IOWA
CODE § 455A. 19(1) (1979); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.170(l) (1980); MD. NAT. RES.
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ume 170 and flow rate1

71

461

of the diversion, and the location 172 and

nature of the water use.1 73 All of those provisions help quantify
the diversion right and prevent overdrafts of available supplies, enable
the administering agencies to ascertain potential sources of use conflicts, and assure that the minimum streamflow is protected.
The ability of the administering agency to prevent water use conflicts
and to protect minimum streamflows is only as good as its data base on the
sizes and locations of diversions and instream uses. To enable the agencies
to obtain such information, the eastern permit statutes require diverters and
users to monitor their diversions and uses1 74 and to maintain records and

175
make periodic reports.
The riparian doctrine prohibits diverting water to nonriparian land or
1 76
to land outside the watershed of the stream from which the water is taken.
These limitations frequently bear little relationship to existing land boundaries or the location of arable land. 177 Some eastern permit statutes remove

CODE § 8-805 (Cum. Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §5105.41(2), .416(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1982); MISS. CODEANN. 5§ 51-3-3(g); -31(b), (g) (1972); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 30.18(3) (a) (West 1973). See MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, § 2.04(1);
NWC REPORT, supra note 77, Recommendation 7-49(a).
170. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6030 (1974) (by implication); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 373.229(e) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981); IOWA
CODE § 455A.19(1) (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 151.170(1) (1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 105.416(2)(1982); Miss. CODEANN. §§51-3-3(g), -7(1), -31(c)(1972); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 30.18(3) (a),. 18(5) (West 1973). See MODEL WATER CODE, supra
note 77, § 2.04(1); NWC REPORT, supranote 77, Recommendation 7-49(d).
171. IOWA CODE §455A.19(1) (1979); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.170(1) (1981);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.41(2), .416(2) (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-3(g),
-7(1) (1972). See NWC REPORT, supra note 77, Recommendation 7-49(d).
172. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3 73.229(g) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51- 3 -3 (g), -31(b), (g) (1972). See MODEL
WATER CODE, supranote 77, 5 2.04(1); NWC REPORT, supranote 77, Recommendation 7-49(c).
173. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.229(f) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE § 455A. 19(1) (1979); MD. NAT. RES. CODE §
8-805 (Cum. Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41(2) (1982); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 51- 3 - 3 (g), -8(1), -31(d), -4-9(2) (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(3) (a)
(West 1973). See MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, § 2.04(1); NWC REPORT,
supra note 77, Recommendation 7-49(c).
174. GA. CODEANN. § 17-510.1(13) (Cum. Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 105.41(4) (1982).
175. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, §6010(f) (3) (Cum. Supp. 1980); GA. CODEANN.
§ 17-510.1(13) (Cum. Supp. 1981); IND. CODEANN. § 13-2-1-6(3),-2-2-6 (Bums
1981); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.160 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41(5) (1982);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-4-7(1) (1), -11(8) (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1A-6,
:4A-2 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.14(a) (1), .16(c) (1978).
176. See notes 22-27 and accompanying text supra.
177. See note 22 supra.
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179

178
those prohibitions and authorize both nonriparian and extra-watershed
diversions and uses.
Administration of permit systems is expensive. Therefore, some eastern
permit statutes provide for an application fee.180 Two permit statutes proroyalty.' 8 ' Presumably, a royalty would encourage efficient
vide for a use 82
water.'
use of

H.

Enforcement

A diversion and use regulatory system cannot work effectively without
adequate enforcement provisions. They are used in the infrequent situation
where a diverter or user refuses to obtain a permit' 18 3 or fails to comply with
the conditions in his permit. The enforcement measures provided in the
85
84
eastern diversion permit statutes include civil fines, 1 civil injunctions,1
permit suspension or forfeiture, 186 criminal liability, 187 and administrative
178. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.223(2) (1974); IND. CODE. ANN. § 13-2-1-6(1)
(Burns 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(5) (West 1973). SeeMODEL WATER USE
ACT, supra note 77, § 407(c); MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, §2.02(2); NWC
REPORT, supra note 77, Recommendation 7-48.
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. §373.223(2) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(14)
(Cum. Supp. 1981); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.200(2) (1980). See MODEL WATER USE
ACT, supra note 77, § 407(c); MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, § 2.02(2); NWC
REPORT, supra note 77, Recommendation 7-48.
180. FLA. STAT. ANN. §373.109(1) (1974); IOWA CODE§ 455A. 19(5) (1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.41(5), .44(10) (1982); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-31
(1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §58:2-1, :2-4(1982). SeeMODEL WATERUSEACT, supra
note 77, § 415; MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, § 1.13.
181. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1314 (1968).
182. Davis, supra note 22, at 699. See MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, at
120-21.
183. See Omemik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 218 N.W.2d 734 (1974) (state obtained
criminal conviction of diverter who refused for years to obtain diversion permit).
184. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1313 (Cum. Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
7, § 6005(b) (1) (Gum. Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-521.1(1) (1971); IND.
CODE ANN. § 13-2-2-13 (Bums 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58: 1A-16, :16A-52, -55
(1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.17(b) (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.19(6)
(West 1973). See MODEL WATER CODE, supranote 77, § 1.25(1)-(2).
185. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6005(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 373.129, .136 (1974); IND. CODEANN. §§ 13-2-11-5, -2-12-1 (Bums 1981); IOWA
CODE § 455A.33 (1979); MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-813 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 105.55 (1977); MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-35 (2) (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
58:4A-4.3 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.17(c) (1978). SeeMODEL WATER
USE ACT, supra note 77, §§ 210, 413; MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 77, §
1.25(1)-(2).
186. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306.D (Cum. Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
373.243(2)-(3) (Gum. Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-510.1(11) (b) to (c) (Cum.
Supp. 1981). See MODEL WATER USE ACT, supranote 77, § 412; MODEL WATER
CODE, supra note 77, § 2.08(2)-(3).
187. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6013(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE §
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
455A.39 (1979); MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-814 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
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cease and desist orders. 188

I.

Adjudication

One of the principal purposes of the eastern diversion permit statutes
is to prevent conflicts over water supplies. This is done by limiting demands
for water through regulating diversions and instream uses. Nonetheless, not
all conflicts can be prevented. Also, from time to time it will be necessary
to determine whether all permitted uses are being made efficiently for
beneficial uses. Furthermore, from time to time it will be necessary to update the minimum protected streamflow because fish and wildlife habitat
and recreational needs do not remain static.
The western prior appropriation states have developed the adjudication
mechanism to make these periodic adjustments. Adjudication is a judicial
or administrative process in which each water user proves his right to divert
or use water. Unused water rights are cancelled and exercised rights are up189
dated to current standards of efficiency. Disputes between users are settled.
Although adjudication is conducted in the western states to establish time
priorities under the prior appropriation concept, adjudication also could be
used to update the record of water rights and to resolve disputes in other
contexts. Only one eastern state, Mississippi, has provided for an adjudication procedure in its diversion permit statute.190

J. Allocation During Water Shortages
The eastern diversion permit statutes have insufficient provisions concerning allocation during water shortages. Many allow the administering
agency to declare the existence of a water shortage, 191 but none take the next
step of establishing allocation priorities during shortages. Three eastern diversion permit statutes, however, allow permit modifications when shortages
occur 192 or when the public interest or conflicts with other property interests
105.541 (1977); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-7(1), -3-55, -4-13 (Cum. Supp. 1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.17 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. §30.18(10) (West 1973).
See MODEL WATER USE ACT, supranote 77, § 701; MODEL WATER CODE, supra

note 77, § 1.25(3).
188. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, § 6018 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 373.119 (Cum.
Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 105.462 (Cum. Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN.

§ 30.195(6) (West 1973).
189. On adjudication procedures, see generally 2 W. HUTCHINS, WATER
RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 444-518 (U.S. Dep't. Agric.

Misc. Pub. No. "1206, 1971).
190. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-47 (1972).
191. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.175, .246 (1974 &Gum. Supp. 1982); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-510.1(12)(Cum. Supp. 1981); IND. CODEANN. § 13-2-2-3 (Burns 1981);
MISS. CODEANN. § 51-4-5(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.13
(Supp. 1979).
192. IOWACODE 5455A.28 (1979); Miss. CODEANN. §51-4-9(3) (Cum. Supp.
.1981). Kentucky authorizes reallocation during shortages. KY. REV. STAT. §
151.200(1)
(1980). of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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make it appropriate. 193
Because one of the purported virtues of the prior appropriation system
is that allocation during shortages is automatic and predictable, eastern diversion permit statutes should also deal with this issue. Because time priority
is being rejected as the allocation criterion both for normal times and during shortages, a different set of allocation criteria for shortages, as well as
for normal times, is imperative. 194
K.

Administrative Arrangements

Most eastern diversion permit statutes establish a statewide regulatory
system with centralized administration. 195 This arrangement has the advantages of ease in establishing uniform policies, efficient use of staff, and centralized data collection. In a few states, however, water supplies vary so much
that permits are required only in areas of potential water shortage. In these
states, the central administering agencies operate permit systems in "critical
use areas."196 One state also decentralized administration of the regional
permit system to regional agencies.197 In designing any new eastern diversion permit system, conditions in the state should determine whether permits should be required statewide or only in critical use areas, and whether
198
permit administration should be centralized or regional.

L.

Characteristicsof a PreferredEastern Diversion Permit Statute

A diversion permit statute should give the state the authority to license
diversions and to place conditions on them, to establish minimum
193. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:1A-7 (1982).
194. The National Water Commission recommends employment of prior appropriation for postenactment uses during shortages, all of which would be inferior
in priority to pre-enactment uses which would share shortages by pro rata reductions. NWC REPORT, supranote 77, Recommendation 7-53.
195. ARK. STAT. ANN. §21-1302(d) (1968); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, 59 6002(5),
(19); 6003(a)-(b) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. §17-510.1(1) (Gum. Supp. 1981); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-11-2, -2-14-5, -2-15-1 (Burns 1981); IOWA CODE§ 455A.18
(1979); KY. REV. STAT. § 151.140 (1980); MD. NAT. RES. CODE § 8-802(a) (1974);

§§ 105.39(3), .41(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 51-3-7 (Cum. Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:16A-52, -55 (1982); N.Y.
MINN. STAT. ANN.

ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-0503 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1981-1982); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 30.18(1), (3) (West 1973).
196. IND.CODEANN.§ 13-2-2-3, -2-2-5 (Burns 1981); MISS. CODEANN. §§

51-4-5, -4-9 (Cum. Supp. 1981); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1A-7, -15, :4A-1 to -2
(1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.13 (Supp. 1979).
197. FLA. STAT.ANN. §§ 373.025(3), .042, .216 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
198. The National Water Commission did not make a recommendation about
administration of the permit system. It did, however, suggest that permit systems
should be established before shortages occur. NWC REPORT, supra note 77, at
280-81. That implies a rejection of the "critical use area" concept adopted in some
eastern permit statutes.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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streamflows and water levels, to obtain diversion data from diverters, and
to enforce permit conditions and minimum streamflows and levels by administrative orders and injunctive relief. It should be comprehensive in the
areas where it is applied, whether in the entire state or only in regions with
potential water shortage problems. It should apply to groundwater diversions as well as to surface watercourse diversions, to protect the base flows
of effluent streams.
The basic characteristics of a desirable diversion permit statute are as
follows:
(1) It applies to diversions from and uses of watercourses and
groundwater, and to artificial impoundments;
(2) Allocations of water are made on the basis of use priorities,
not time priorities; the priorities selected should reflect public
interest, economic, and social values;
(3) Diversions and instream uses are permitted only from water
surpluses over streamflows and water levels needed for fish
and wildlife habitat, recreational uses, and maintenance of
assimilative capacities;
(4) Efficient use of water is required;
(5) Reporting of diversions is required;
(6) Permits have a fixed term long enough to amortize capital
investments in water use facilities, but short enough to allow
the development of new uses; an appropriate term might be
twenty years, with a fifty year term for very large facilities,
such as dams; to assist the entry of new uses, the permit is
not automatically renewable;
(7) Common law riparian and prescriptive rights are abolished,
but permits would be issued for uses exercised when or shortly
after the statute goes into effect;
(8) Permits are not transferable to other locations;
(9) Nonriparian and extra-watershed uses are allowed;
(10) Allocation of water during shortages is provided for, with
defined priorities;
(11) A method for administratively adjudicating water use conflicts is provided; and
(12) Adequate enforcement powers are provided.
The permit system could be applied by either a regional or a state agency.
The system could be limited to critical use areas. Specified small diversions,
such as single-family domestic uses, could be exempted from the permit
requirement.
VI. POSSIBLE FORMATS FOR REGULATING WATER RESOURCES

There are four possible formats for statutes regulating water resources.
The first two are designed only to protect minimum streamflows for various
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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public purposes and do not allocate water between users. The third is
designed for data collection only. The fourth is the diversion permit system.
This section will outline the various forms and discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of each.
The four statutory formats are:
(1) Authority to seek injunctions against diversions threatening
fish and wildlife habitats or public recreational rights;
(2) State authority to establish minimum streamflows and water
levels for fish and wildlife habitat and recreational purposes,
coupled with authority to seek injunctions against diversions
encroaching on those minimum streamflows and levels;
(3) Mandatory diversion reporting; and
(4) Diversion permit system.
A.

Injunction Statute

Many states have enacted statutes defining certain activities as public
nuisances enjoinable by the state attorney general, the local prosecuting attorney, or other public officials. 199 Minimum streamflows and water levels
could be protected by such a statute declaring that diversions which substantially threaten fish and wildlife habitats, substantially interfere with the exercise of public recreational rights, or substantially impair the waste
assimilative capacity of a watercourse are public nuisances. Fines could be
added to the injunction remedy. No public nuisance injunction statutes today cover streamflows or water levels.
The advantages of a public nuisance injunction statute include its simple
language. It probably would not engender substantial political opposition
among diverters. It could be effective with adequate monitoring of river flows
and diversion points. It would not involve any paperwork for diverters.
The disadvantages are many and great. Because such a statute would
not provide for monitoring of water levels and flows and for reporting of
diversions, many unlawful diversions would go undetected. The statute
would not allocate water users, but would require a lawsuit to stop a diversion; this might take so long that the remedy could be enforced only after
the damage had become irreparable. The state would have to prove each
time that the particular diversion was excessive. Litigation is a cumbersome
means of enforcement when the unlawful depletion results from multiple
diversions. Diverters could not know in advance how much they could divert
without violating the statute. The lawfulness of a diversion would depend
in part on the weather, the activities of neighboring diverters, and the loca199. In Missouri, see, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 71.285 (weeds), 71.760 (smoke),
236.240 (unsafe dams), 263.262 (Johnson grass) (1978). On the statutory declaration of public nuisances as a valid exercise of the police power, see generally W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 88 (4th ed. 1971); W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 136-42 (1977).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/2
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tions of fish and wildlife habitats, public recreational access points, and waste
discharge outfalls, not all of which would be known to the diverter.
B.

Streamflow and Water Level Statute

A few states have statutes that authorize a state agency to establish
minimum water levels and minimum streamflows. Most of them involve
lakes or reservoirs. 20 0 The principal purpose of those statutes is to protect
fish and wildlife habitats in and recreational uses of the regulated waters.
Enforcement of streamflows and water levels typically is by administrative
order, followed by an injunction if necessary.
The advantages of such a statute include the ability of the state to determine in advance the minimum streamflows and water levels needed to protect fish and wildlife habitats, public recreational uses, and waste assimilation needs. Standards would be established for each river, lake, and stream.
The standards would provide a guide to diverters that would enable them
to ascertain the lawfulness of their diversions at all times. The standards
would ensure that diverters would not exhaust water supplies and enable
them to plan their annual diversion activities with considerable assurance
that the state agency would not interfere. They would provide a guide for
diversion lawfulness if an injunction lawsuit becomes necessary. The standards would be presumed valid; the state would not have to prove their
validity to establish a prima facie case for injunctive relief. The statute would
not create any paperwork for diverters. In short, this type of statute would
create greater predictability for diverters and easier enforcement for the state
agency than would the injunction statute.
The disadvantages of a streamflow and water level statute include the
absence of monitoring of water levels and flows and reporting of diversions.
Many unlawful diversions would go undetected. Enforcement would be
easier in the individual case under this type of statute, but not necessarily
more comprehensive in application, than under the injunction statute. The
streamflow and water level statute would not allocate water between users,
but merely would define the portion of the water resource available to them
as a group.

C.

Mandatory Diversion Reporting

By itself, mandatory diversion reporting merely requires the submission of information. In order to achieve regulation of minimum streamflows
and water levels, it must be coupled with a streamflow and water level statute.
Missouri has a voluntary large diversion reporting statute, 20 1 which probably
is widely ignored. 20 2 A bill to make such reporting mandatory died in com200. See IND. CODEANN. §§ 13-2-11-2, -2-12-1, -2-14-3, -2-14-5, -2-18-1 (Bums
1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.42 (Ia) (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 31.02(1) (West
1973).
201. Mo. REV. STAT. § 256.370 (1978).
202.

Comment of Larry Fellows, Missouri Geological Survey, to Author (Jan.

1978).
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mittee in the 1978 session of the Missouri legislature. 20 3 Another was con20 4
sidered in the 1980 session, but did not even reach committee deliberations.
Other states also have diversion reporting statutes.205 None of these statutes
are coupled with any state injunctive powers.
Reporting of diversions is necessary to comprehensive monitoring of
streamflows and water levels. Without such information, diversions threatening fish and wildlife habitats, the exercise of public recreational rights, and
waste assimilative capacities may go undetected. Data on diversions not only
indicates their locations and sizes, but also aids in the prediction of locations
of encroachments on minimum streamflows. For prediction purposes,
streamflow and water level data of the type now obtained by the United States
Geological Survey and diversion data from the users must be obtained
frequently.
The advantages of mandatory diversion reporting include the creation
of a data base to predict future streamflow and water level problems. It can
also pinpoint the sources of those problems, so that remedies would be more
timely. It makes comprehensive enforcement of minimum streamflows and
water levels possible in practice because few unlawful diversions would go
undetected.
The disadvantages of mandatory diversion reporting include the inability
of the state to control the sizes of diversions. When diversion sizes and locations can be controlled, the state can prevent encroachment on fish and
wildlife habitats and interferences with public recreational rights and waste
assimilative capacities. Under a mere reporting statute, even coupled with
injunctive powers, the state only can stop encroachments after they occur.
The mandatory nature of the statute may create a difficult legal problem.
The very reporting of diversions that prove to be unlawful may make enforcement against them unconstitutional. It could be argued that the reporting of unlawful diversions would be prohibited as self-incrimination under
the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution 20 6 and under the Bill
of Rights of the Missouri Constitution. 20 7 This argument was rejected in
connection with reporting of unlawful waste discharges under the federal
Clean Water Act. 2 8 Because that federal case dealt only with civil penalties
and the decision was grounded on a somewhat arbitrary acceptance of Congressional intent, the disposition of a similar argument under a mandatory
diversion reporting statute by the Missouri Supreme Court cannot be
predicted.
203.
204.

H.R. 1787, 79th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1978).
H.R. 1061, 80th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1980).
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1316 (Cum. Supp. 1981).

205.
206. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
207. MO. CONST. art. I, § 10.
208. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). SeeClean WaterAct, §§ 308,
311(b) (5), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318, 1321(b) (5) (1976).
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Diversion Permit Statute

A diversion permit statute would give the state the authority to license
diversions and to place conditions on them, to establish minimum
streamflows and water levels, to obtain diversion data from diverters, and
to enforce permit conditions and minimum streamflows and levels by administrative orders and injunctive relief. A diversion permit statute would
give the state the ability to prevent encroachments on minimum streamflows
and water levels needed to protect fish and wildlife habitat, public recreational rights, and waste assimilative capacities, not merely the right to restore
them after encroachment has occurred. It would be comprehensive in the
areas where it is applied, whether in the entire state or only in regions with
potential water shortage problems. It should apply to groundwater diversions as well as to surface watercourse diversions, so that the base flows of
effluent streams can be protected.
The advantages of a diversion permit statute include the ability of the
state to prevent encroachment on minimum streamflows and water levels.
It would give the state the ability to prevent or mitigate conflicts between
water users and the ability to influence the direction and pattern of water
use development. Monitoring of diversions and elimination of unlawful
diversions is maximized.
The principal disadvantage may make it politically impossible to enact
a diversion permit statute. It impinges directly on private decisionmaking
about land uses and land development whenever and wherever a water shortage occurs. Private water use proposals are subject to state agency approval
and, therefore, to possible state veto. This disadvantage is no greater for
a diversion permit statute than for general land use zoning, but the latter
also is a contentious policy in this state. In addition, the diversion permit
statute reporting requirement is subject to the self-incrimination problem
discussed above with regard to mandatory diversion reporting.
In 1969, a bill was introduced in the Missouri Senate to establish a diversion permit system. 20 9 It would have required permits for all diversions and
impoundments of surface watercourses, withdrawals of groundwater, and
levees and drainage projects, 210 except domestic and livestock watering uses,
diversions less than 25,000 gallons per day, most public water supplies, and
uses on the Mississippi, Missouri, and Des Moines Rivers and on the lower
portion of the St. Francis River.2 11 The bill provided for the establishment
of minimum protected streamflows 12 to provide a reasonable supply of water
for public uses, including public water supply, exempted uses, fish and
wildlife habitat, and water quality maintenance.2 1 3 The permit terms were
209.

S. 245, 75th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1969).

211.
212.

Id. §§ 1(8): 4(1).
Id. § 11(2).

210. Id. §§ 4(1)' 7.
213. Id. § 1(5).
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to be determined administratively, 214 and permits would have been forfeited
for three years of nonuse. 2 15 The bill was not enacted.
VII. RECOMMENDATION

Missouri should enact a diversion permit statute in the form described
above in Part V.L. 216 The benefits and advantages of such a statute outweigh

the detriments and disadvantages. Ad hoc private decisionmaking about
water diversions and uses inevitably leads to conflicts between diverters and
users and to substantial threats to fish and wildlife habitats and substantial
interferences with public recreational rights and waste assimilative capacities.
This occurs under riparian law during water shortages because the private
diverters and users cannot predict the adverse effects of their uses on public
interests and because no substantial means of public recourse exists when
encroachments occur.
Missouri can expect to develop areas of water shortage within the
foreseeable future. Failure to regulate water diversions and uses by that time
will make destruction of habitat and recreational opportunities inevitable
and will generate conflicts between water users. The state should be ready
to deal with these problems before they become serious. To do this, the state
needs a data base of diversions and the power to prevent shortages before
they occur by limiting demand.

214.
215.

Id. § 4(4).
Id. §8(4).

216. A diversion permit statute in this form is constitutional. See, e.g., Ausness,
supra note 28, at 252-55; Hines, A Decade ofExperience under the Iowa Permit System (Part
II), 8 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 23, 43-52 (1968); King, Regulationof Water Rights under
the Police Power, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAw 271,292-304,350-51 (Univ.
of Mich. Law School 1958); Lauer, The RiparianRight as Property, in id. 133, 208-11;
O'Connell, Iowa'sNew Water Statute- The ConstitutionalityofRegulatingExisting Uses
of Water, 47 IOWA L. REV. 549, 581-609, 634-36 (1962); Comment, Modification of
the RiparianTheory and Due Process in Missouri, 34 MO. L. REV. 562, 571-74 (1969).
See also MISSOURI INSTREAM FLOW REQUIREMENTS, supra note 7, at 233-81.
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